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I.Introduction
"Runaway" film and television production is a public policy issue
that has been targeted for reform with the goal of its eradication,' a
goal that has not been achieved.2 The discussion has framed the issue
as one relating to international trade policy and labor policy, and as a
result proposals to eradicate the problem have been focused on these
areas. This article takes the position that runaway film and television
production is an international tax law issue that should be examined
within the framework of U.S. international tax policy. In general, the
U.S. international tax laws require reform because they subsidize U.S.
businesses in amounts that are detrimental to the fiscal stability of the
United States in addition to being inefficient and inequitable.
Motion picture tax incentives ("MPIs") provided by other countries
to induce runaway film and television production exacerbate the
existing inefficiency, inequity, and fiscal instability of the U.S.
international tax laws, and should be immediately addressed by
amendments to U.S. international tax laws.4 My proposals will make
the U.S. international tax laws more efficient and equitable, as well as
create more tax revenue for the United States, while at the same time
will help eradicate runaway film and television production.
Numerous studies and articles regarding U.S. international tax
laws have concluded that the present laws affecting U.S.-based
multinational corporations ("MNCs") are too generous to these
taxpayers, inefficient, unnecessarily reduce U.S. tax receipts, and
reduce tax equity. Therefore, they should be reformed.! Although
1. See infra Part II.B. For purposes of this article, "runaway" film and television
production refers to projects that go to other countries rather than from one U.S. state to
another U.S. state; see also MARTHA JONES, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION IN
CALIFORNIA, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU 2 (2002) for a definition of "runaway" production.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See infra note 5.
4. See infra Part VI.
5. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. 4150, OPTIONS FOR TAXING
MULTINATIONAL CORPS. (2013) [hereinafter OPTIONS FOR TAXING]; THE WHITE HOUSE
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 1 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Docu
mentsfhe-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S TAX REFORM]; S. FIN. COMM., INTERNATIONAL COMPETTIVENESS (2013),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/050813%20International%20Compet-itiveness%
200ptions%2OPaperl.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS]; JANE G.
GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2010) [hereinafter TAX HAVENS]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS.,
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there is unanimity regarding the need to reform the U.S. international
tax laws, the numerous reform proposals have not produced a
consensus as to a specific overall reform design.' To this point,
reforming the U.S. international tax laws has been a piecemeal
process. Certain inefficiencies are identified and specific laws are
enacted to address those specific issues.!
These issues have been formally recognized by the Obama
Administration in The President's Framework For Business Tax
Reform as follows:
America's system of business taxation is in need of
reform .... As a result of [the] combination of a relatively
narrow tax base and a high statutory tax rate, the U.S. tax
system is uncompetitive and inefficient. The system distorts
choices such as where to produce, what to invest in, how to
finance a business, and what business form to use. And it does
OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S.
BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007), http://www.treasury.gov/ resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/Approaches-to-Improve-Business-Tax-Competitiveness-12-20-
2007.pdf [hereinafter APPROACHES TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS]; Mihir A. Desai, C.
Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., Taxation and Multinational Activity: New Evidence, New
Interpretations, 82 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUS. 6, 16 (2006) [hereinafter Taxation New
Evidence]; James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations,
in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Alan J., Auerbach ed. 1997)
[hereinafter Hines, Tax Policy]; Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,
54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay,
Worse than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2010); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1573 (2000); J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a US. Exemption
System for Foreign Income When the Treasury Is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397 (2013)
[hereinafter Clifton, Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a US. Exemption System]; Robert J.
Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral
of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455 (1999) [hereinafter Fleming,
Peroni & Shay, Curtailing Deferral]; William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should
Begin at Home: Replace the Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 647 (2010) [hereinafter Barker, International Tax Reform]; Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., Assessing the Following Systems for Taxing Foreign-Source Active Business
Income: Deferra4 Exemption and Imputation, 53 How. L.J. 337 (2010); Timothy Hisao
Shapiro, Tax First, Ask Questions Later: Problems Predicting The Effect of Obama's
International Tax Reforms, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 141 (2010). For purposes of this
article, MNCs are defined as taxpayers that are large U.S.-based companies investing capital
and selling their goods and services both domestically and abroad.
6. Id.
7. Barker, International Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 648-49. See also JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
CHAIRMAN'S STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT OF PROVISIONS TO REFORM INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TAXATION, JCX-15-13 (Joint Comm. Print 2013).
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too little to encourage job creation and investment in the
United States while allowing firms to benefit from incentives
to locate production and shift profits overseas.'
Part II of this article reviews the background of runaway film and
television production, describes the parties involved, and explains why
the issue is a tax issue. Part III examines the potential government
responses to public policy issues in order to establish a clear
understanding of the issues. Part IV analyzes the actions that the U.S.
federal and state governments have taken in their attempt to eradicate
runaway film and television production. Part V provides background on
the U.S. international tax laws and tax avoidance. Part VI offers U.S.
international tax law amendments that will make U.S. international tax
laws more efficient and equitable and will create more tax revenue for
the United States, while contributing to the eradication of runaway film
and television production.
II. Runaway Film and Television Production
Runaway film and television production has been defined as "the
migration of the production of U.S.-developed films to countries
outside the United States..."' and has been the subject of U.S.
government hearings, federal and state legislation, fourteen academic
articles and six major studies."o Since the articles and studies have
8. PRESIDENT'S TAx REFORM, supra note 5, at 1.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE MIGRATION OF U.S. FILMS AND TELEVISION
PRODUCTION 2 (2001) [hereinafter DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS]; see also
Gail Frommer, Hooray for... Toronto? Hollywood, Collective Bargaining And Extraterritorial
Union Rules In An Era Of Globalization, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 64-66 (2004) for a
basic explanation of the three phases of film production. For purposes of this article "runaway
production" will include production and postproduction of film and television projects because
foreign countries have begun offering postproduction tax incentives in addition to production
tax incentives.
10. I.R.C. § 181 (2004); United States Negotiating Objectives for the World Trade
Organization Seattle Ministerial Meeting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Comm.
of Ways & Means, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Objectives for the WTO Seattle
Ministerial Meeting 1999]; United States Negotiating Objectives for the World Trade
Organization Seattle Ministerial Meeting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade, Comm.
on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Objectives for the WTO Seattle
Ministerial Meeting 2000]; Outcome of the World Trade Organization Ministerial in Seattle:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
(2000). See also 148 CONG. REC. 6420 (2002) (Sen. Lincoln, introducing the U.S.
Independent Film and Television Production Incentive Act of 2001:
I rise to discuss the U.S. Independent Film and Television Production
Incentive Act of 2001 .... This is a bill designed to address the problem
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of runaway film and television production which is a major trade-related
issue which costs our nation billions of dollars each year.).
Id. See also Small Business and Rural Economic Development: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 7 (2002) (statement of Sen. Lincoln, Member, S. Fin. Comm.)
("Some think that, on the face, the bill [S. 1278, The U.S. Independent Film Incentives
Act] appears to just help Hollywood."). United States Independent Film and Television
Production Incentive Act of 2003, S. 1613, 108th Cong. (2003); S. REP. No. 108-92, at 73
(2003); see also Select Tax Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the Committee on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Rep.
McCarthy, Member, H. Comm. on Ways and Means)
The purpose of H.R. 4736, the Independent Film Small Business Job
Creation Act, is to help create jobs in the United States by encouraging
investment in film production here at home .... In summary, this bill
would address runaway productions by encouraging investment in
independent film projects in the United States.
Id. See Press Release, Gretchen Hamel, Deputy Assistant for Public and Media Affairs
for the Office of the United States Trade Representatives, regarding a Section 301 Petition
on Canadian Film Subsidies (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/archives/2007/october/statement-gretchen-hamel-deputy-assistant;
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9; THE MONITOR CO., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF U.S. FILM AND TELEVISION RUNAWAY FILM PRODUCTION
(1999) [hereinafter THE MONITOR REPORT]; NEIL CRAIG ASSOCS., INTERNATIONAL
FILM & TELEVISION PRODUCTION IN CANADA (2004) [hereinafter NEIL CRAIG
ASSOCS.]; STEPHEN M. KATZ, CTR. FOR ENT. INDUS. DATA & RESEARCH, THE
MIGRATION OF FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. TO CANADA AND
BEYOND: YEAR 2001 PRODUCTION REPORT (Mark A. Rosenthal ed., 2002) [hereinafter
KATZ, 2001 PRODUCTION REPORT]; STEPHEN M. KATZ, CTR. FOR ENT. INDUS. DATA &
RESEARCH, THE GLOBAL SUCCESS OF PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES AND THE
MIGRATION OF FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. TO THE WORLD: YEAR
2005 PRODUCTION REPORT (Mark A. Rosenthal ed. 2006) [hereinafter KATZ, 2005
PRODUCTION REPORT]; WISCONSIN DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
OF WISCONSIN FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAM (2009), available at http://www.ctvoices.org/
sites/default/files/bud09wisconsinppt.pdf; ECONOMICS RESEARCH ASSOC., LOUISIANA
MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES (2009),
available at http://www.louisianaeconomicdevelopment.com/documents/additionalresourc
es/ERAEntertainmentReport.pdf; KEVIN KLOWDEN, ANUSUYA CHATTERJEE &
CANDICE FLOR HYNEK, MILKEN INST., FILM FLIGHT: LOST PRODUCTION AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA (2010) [hereinafter KEVIN KLOWDEN ET AL., FILM
FLIGHT]; TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, AN ANALYSIS OF TEXAS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES (2010); Krista Boryskavich & Aaron Bowler,
Hollywood North: Tax Incentives and the Film Industry in Canada, 2 ASPER REV. INT'L
BUS. & TRADE L. 25 (2002); Frommer, supra note 9; Pamela Conley Ulich & Lance
Simmens, Motion Picture Production: To Run or Stay Made In the U.S.A., 21 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 357 (2001); Christopher H. Lytton, Soft Money: The Weapon of Choice for
the Runaway Productions, 35 McGEORGE L. REV. 719 (2004); Claire Wright,
Hollywood's Disappearing Act: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home,
39 AKRON L. REV. 739 (2006); Adrian McDonald, Through The Looking Glass: Runaway
Productions and "Hollywood Economics," 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 879 (2007)
[hereinafter McDonald, Through The Looking Glass]; Kevin Lee, The Little State
Department: Hollywood and the MPAA's Influence on U.S. Trade Relations, 28 NW. J.
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extensively addressed the who, what, where, when, and how, this
article will summarize the basic points necessary for a general
understanding of the issue, while more fully exploring those points
most relevant to the arguments herein presented.
A. Factors in Choosing a Production Location
The film and television industries are similar to other U.S.
industries that have decided to produce or manufacture a product in a
country other than the United States; the computer and electronic
industry and the apparel industry are good examples. Since, however,
film and television production contains an artistic component that
potentially places their decision making process in a different
category than most other industries, principal photography may, out
of necessity, occur outside the United States solely or partially based
on creative and artistic requirements of the project. For example, a
script may call for an authentic location that only exists at a non-U.S.
venue." However, research has indicated that since the beginning of
the 1990s, artistic factors-as opposed to economic factors-have had
little influence on film and television producers' decision to produce a
project outside of the United States. 2 These primary economic
INT'L L. & BUS. 371 (2007-2008); Jonathan M. Turco, Leaving Los Angeles: Runaway
Productions and the FTAC's 301(A) Petition Under International Law, 15 SW. J. INT'L L.
141 (2009); William Luther, Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for
Lackluster Policy, 173 TAX FOUNDATION: SPECIAL REPORT (2010); ROBERT
TANNENWALD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE FILM SUBSIDIES: NOT
MUCH BANG FOR Too MANY BUCKS (2010); Joshua R. Schonauer, Star Billing?
Recasting State Tax Incentives for the "Hollywood" Machine, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 381 (2010);
Joseph Henchman, More States Abandon Film Tax Incentives as Programs' Ineffectiveness
Becomes More Apparent, 272 TAx FOUNDATION: FISCAL FACT (2011); Adrian
McDonald, Down the Rabbit Hole: The Madness of State Film Incentives as a "Solution" to
Runaway Production, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 85, 109 (2011) [hereinafter McDonald, Down
the Rabbit Hole]; Courtney Siders, Legislative Update, Independent Film and Television
Production Incentive Act: Congress Attempts to Prevent Runaways, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 495 (2001); Heidi Sarah Wicker, Note, Making a Run for the Border:
Should the United States Stem Runaway Film and Television Production Through Tax and
other Financial Incentives?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 461 (2003); Carlynn B.
Ferguson, Legislative Update, Runaway Production: An Analysis of California's
Legislative Response to Film Production Incentives in Other States and Abroad, 16
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 111 (2005).
11. KATZ, 2005 PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 10, at 29; see also Ulich &
Simmens, supra note 10, at 357, 359 (citing IRVING BERNSTEIN, HOLLYWOOD AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY,
HOLLYWOOD AFL FILM COUNCIL REPORT 65 (1957)).
12. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 10, at 31; KATZ, 2005 PRODUCTION REPORT,
supra note 10, at 4; but see NEIL CRAIG ASSOCS., supra note 10, at 35. The U.S.
Department of Commerce report:
248 36:2
determinants for choosing the location of production include: (1)
labor costs; (2) monetary exchange rates; and (3) tax incentives.13
If the problem of runaway production is to be solved, then it is
necessary first to determine the precise effect of each of these
economic factors on producers' decision to produce within or outside
of the United States, and to weigh the importance of each factor in
the decision process. There have been several commentaries on the
matter. For example, one law review article has concluded that it is
impossible to measure the influence of each factor in the decision of a
production to runaway. 4 Another report, on the other hand, suggests
that "[m]any people in the Canadian film and television industry
believe that the single most critical factor in accounting for the
presence of U.S. production in Canada is the value of the dollar," and
that there is "some evidence to suggest there is an inverse
relationship between the exchange rate and the level of production,
although it is far from conclusive."'" Still another commentator
argues that the tax incentives provided by governments are the
primary factor in deciding where to locate production." In spite of
the variety of opinions on the matter, most commentators and studies
default to a position of aggregating the economic factors as "costs" of
producing film and television projects, concluding that such costs are
either increasing within the United States and/or decreasing at
locations outside the United States, thereby collectively determining
the location of production." My conclusion is that regardless of the
influence of any single factor within the balancing of "costs" in
choosing a location for production, the international tax policy of the
[S]tates there is no evidence to support the conclusion that foreign
incentives alone have been the reason that U.S.-based productions have
been growing in other countries. Instead, the Department of Commerce
concludes that globalization, rising costs, foreign incentives and
technological change in the industry have combined to transform the
U.S. industry into an increasingly dispersed global industry.
Id.
13. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9, at 29; NEIL CRAIG
Assocs., supra note 10, at 43; Ulich & Simmens, supra note 10, at 362-65; Boryskavich &
Bowler, supra note 10, at 31.
14. Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 10, at 36.
15. NEIL CRAIG ASSOCS., supra note 10, at 12.
16. McDonald, Through The Looking Glass, supra note 10, at 903.
17. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9, at 59-64; KATZ, 2001
PRODUCrION REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7; THE MONITOR REPORT, supra note 10, at
4-5; KEVIN KLOWDEN ET AL., FILM FLIGHT, supra note 10, at 17-18.
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United States will require eliminating foreign MPIs as a factor in
taxpayers deciding whether to produce in the United States or in
another country."
Although the precise effect of each economic factor has yet to be
quantified, there is unanimous agreement among research that
certain film and television projects are in fact choosing to move
outside the United States for production." Canada, United Kingdom,
Ireland, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand head the list,20
although other countries are added to and subtracted from the list of
countries preferred for runaway productions each year. It should be
noted that Canada has been the most consistent destination for U.S.-
based producers since 1996.21
Canada publishes an annual report providing an economic
analysis of its screen-based production industry activity that details
information about film and television productions from other
countries.22 Canadian reports have been providing the aggregate
amounts spent by foreign producers on location and service within its
borders from 2002 to the present (referred to as Foreign Location and
Services-"FLS"). 23 FLS is defined as "largely comprised of feature
films and television programs filmed in Canada by foreign producers
or Canadian service producers," and is reported by Canada to have
averaged $1.665 billion in U.S. currency spent in Canada per year
since 2002, 80% of which has been accounted for by U.S. producers.24
By Canada's own accounts, U.S. producers like to film in Canada.
18. See infra Parts V. and VI.
19. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9, at 59-64; KATZ, 2001
PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7; THE MONITOR REPORT, supra note 10, at
4-5; KEVIN KLOWDEN ET AL., FILM FLIGHT, supra note 10, at 17-18; see also DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS supra note 9, at 60 (discussing a possible solution for
isolating the economic effects on runaway production) ("[a] complex regression analysis
would be required to test whether cost differences were in fact driving runaway
production, a task that is beyond the scope of this paper.").
20. KATZ, 2001 PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 10, at 17-22; Lytton, supra note
10, at 731-34; Wright, supra note 10.
21.DEP'T OF COMM., MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9, at 85-87 (citing the Netherlands
and South Africa as runaway destinations); Katz, 2005 Production Report, supra note 10,
at 33-61 (citing Eastern Europe as a destination).
22. CANADIAN MEDIA PROD. ASs'N AND ASS'N DES PRODUCTEURS DE FILMS ET
DE TELtVISION DU QUPBEC, PROFILE 2012, AN ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE SCREEN-
BASED PRODUCTION INDUSTRY IN CANADA [hereinafter CMPA 2012 REPORT].
23. The individual CANADIAN MEDIA PROD. ASS'N AND ASS'N DES PRODUCTEURS
DE FILMS ET DE TfLtVISION DU QUtBEC, PROFILE reports covering each year from 2005
through 2012 are available at http://www.cmpa.calindustry-information/profile.
24. CMPA 2012 REPORT, supra note 22 at 76-77 (The percentage of FLS that is
comprised of U.S. producers has not been reported every year by Canada.).
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Reports from other countries indicate similar activity by U.S.
producers in their countries.25
B. Six Studies of the Causes and Economic Impact of Runaway Production
While not reaching uniform conclusions, six studies have provided
detailed analysis regarding the causes and the economic impact of
runaway production,26 and each successive study and academic review
of such studies has explored possible reasons for such differences
from previous reports, sometimes pointedly disagreeing. The issue of
runaway production has mostly been framed as an international trade
issue that affects jobs and economic revenue; that is, U.S. jobs and
economic revenue are lost when productions runaway to other
countries. There has been disagreement regarding the influence of
each economic factor on the location of production, as well as
consistent disagreement concerning the exact number of jobs and the
precise amount of economic revenue that the U.S. is losing because of
runaway production. The amount of economic loss has been
estimated to be as low as $1.7 billion and as high as $10.3 billion per
year; the number of U.S. jobs lost has been estimated to be as low as
23,500 per year and as high as 47,000 per year.
Whether or not runaway production should be addressed by the
government because of international trade requirements or the extent
of claimed loss of American jobs and economic revenue is beyond the
scope of this article and no conclusions will be drawn in regards to
these two issues. However, it is my position that the availability of
foreign MPIs for U.S. film and television production companies
25. The Economic Impact of the UK Film Industry, OXFORD ECONOMICS 51 (Sept.
2012), http://www.creativecoalitioncampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/bfi-economic-impact-
of-the-uk-film-industry-2012-09-17.pdf [hereinafter OXFORD ECONOMICS]; Annual Report
2012-2013, SCREEN AUSTRALIA (Oct. 2013), https://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/get
media/da335dc3-cf26-4450-8417-75e273933d34/AR_1213.pdf; Annual Report 2012/2013,
MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUS. (2013), http://www.mti.gov.naldownloads/Ministryof
TradeAnnualReport_201213.pdf; Focus Germany, GERMANY COPRODUCTION PARTNERS
(Apr. 2013), http//www.location-germany.de/ runterlader/German _CoproductionPartners.pdf.
26. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9; THE MONITOR
REPORT, supra note 10; KATZ, 2001 PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 10; NEIL CRAIG
ASSOCS., supra note 10; KATZ, 2005 PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 10; KEVIN
KLOWDEN ET AL., FILM FLIGHT, supra note 10, at 17-26.
27. THE MONITOR REPORT, supra note 10; KATZ, 2001 PRODUCTION REPORT,
supra note 10; KATZ, 2005 PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note 10; see also McDonald,
Through The Looking Glass, supra note 10, at 902-19 (evaluating the labor and economic
conclusions in certain reports). but see NEIL CRAIG ASSOCS., supra note 10, at 1, 24
(claiming that employment in the U.S. film and television industry increased 6.6%
between 1998 and 2004).
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requires a reexamination of the effect that such foreign MPIs have on
U.S. international tax policy as well as the appropriate responses
thereto. Therefore, for the purposes of this article, I need only
demonstrate that foreign MPIs are one of the factors in the decision
of U.S.-based producers as to where to locate their productions.
Whether or not there exists reliable demonstration or proof of the
exact extent of lost U.S. jobs and economic revenue should not be
determinative for the United States to act. In this regard, every study
and commentary that has analyzed the causes of runaway production
(including the study commissioned by the Canadian government) has
reached the same conclusion: tax incentives are a factor in the process
of determining the location of film and television production.
Therefore, the foreign MPIs lack synergy with U.S. international tax
policy, strongly suggesting an evaluation of those policies.2
C. U.S. Taxpayers Utilizing Foreign Motion Picture Tax Incentives
Addressing the issue of runaway production also requires
determining which U.S. taxpayers are utilizing foreign MPIs. MPI
users are primarily major studios, mini-major studios and the
television companies associated with them. 29 For purposes of this
article, these producers are defined as taxpayers that are large U.S.-
based companies investing capital and selling their goods and services
both domestically and abroad, companies that are also known as
MNCs.3 0 The countries providing incentives do not report the identity
of the recipients which precludes a definitive finding that U.S.-based
MNCs have been receiving the foreign MPIs. Although the concrete
evidence is lacking, certain conclusions can be drawn from the
statistics that have been reported. Since 2003, 73% to 89% of all FLS
in Canada has occurred in British Columbia and Ontario." In
addition, the British Columbia Film Commission and the Ontario
Media Development Corporation ("OMDC") provide an annual list
of productions that have filmed in each province during the year, and
includes such information as the title and company of each
production. Further, in 2012, British Columbia reported FLS
production activity of forty-seven feature films (not including digital
28. See Graetz, supra note 5, at 327 (stating that "[t]he important role played by tax
considerations in business activities is not surprising, and is confirmed by more
sophisticated empirical analyses," in his analysis of the U.S. taxation of large inbound and
outbound flows of both direct and portfolio investment).
29. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
30. See OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 3.
31. CMPA 2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 80.
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feature films), twenty-six television series, eleven television pilots and
twelve movie-of-the-week productions for an aggregate amount spent
in British Columbia of approximately $813 million.32 U.S.-based
major studios and their television companies were reported to be
approximately 85% of those projects, accounting for seventy-five of
the eighty-eight productions.33 In addition, production activity
provided by OMDC revealed thirty-one FLS feature films, television
series, television pilots, and movie-of-the-week productions for an
aggregate amount spent in Ontario of approximately $380 million.'
U.S.-based major studios and their television companies represented
approximately 87% of the projects, that is, accounting for twenty-
seven of the thirty-one foreign productions." Overall, the British
Columbia Film Commission and the OMDC information provided for
productions filmed in each province between 2000 and 2011 clearly
support the conclusion that U.S-based MNCs (that is, major studios,
mini-major studios and the latter corporations' television companies)
have represented significant FLS production activity in these
provinces during those twelve years. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that MNCs are making their economic decisions with the goal
32. British Columbia Film Commission, Production Statistics, MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY, SPORT
& CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (2012), http://www.creativebc.com/database/files/library/2012
StatsPackage.pdf [hereinafter British Columbia Production Credits]. See also CMPA
2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 80.
33. 2012 Production Credits, CREATIVE BC, http://www.creativebc.comlindustry-sec
tors/motion-picture/production-credits (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (Walt Disney, Co.
accounted for eleven projects; Sony Corp. accounted for seven projects; CBS Corp.
accounted for four projects; Time Warner, Inc. accounted for eighteen projects; Viacom,
Inc. accounted three projects; Comcast Corp. accounted for twelve projects; News Corp.
accounted for seven projects; and thirteen projects by the following publicly traded
companies: World Wrestling Ent., Inc., Mattel, Inc., DirectTv, Lionsgate Ent., Summit
Ent., Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., Mandalay, and Crown Media Holdings, Inc.).
34. Shot in Ontario 2012, ONTARIO MEDIA DEV. CORP. (2013), http://www.omdc.
on.ca/Assets/Communications/Annual+Productions+in+Ontario/Produ-
ctions+in+Ontario+2012_en.pdf [hereinafter PRODUCTION IN ONTARIO 2012]; see also
CMPA 2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 80.
35. Id. (The Walt Disney Co. accounted for four projects; Sony Corp. accounted for
two projects; CBS Corp. accounted for three projects; Time Warner, Inc. accounted for
two projects; Viacom, Inc. accounted nine projects; Comcast Corp. accounted for ten
projects; three projects by the following publicly traded companies: Lionsgate Ent. and
Crown Media Holdings, Inc.; and one project by The Weinstein Co.).
36. British Columbia Production Credits supra note 32; PRODUCTION IN ONTARIO
2012, supra note 34; Made in the UK, BRITISH FILM INSTITUTE, http://industry.bfi.org.uk
/ukfeaturefilms (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (The British Film Commission does not provide
detailed statistics regarding films that choose the UK for production, but the British Film
Institute ("BFI") does provide information on some of the films and television projects
that have filmed there between 2005 and 2009, reporting that fifty-five feature films filmed
in the U.K. during that time period were by U.S.-based MNCs.).
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of maximizing profits for their shareholders, and are exploiting all
possibilities of increasing their profits including accessing the
available foreign MPIs for their projects.
D. Runaway Production Is a Tax Issue
An important issue to examine is why runaway film and television
production is a tax issue and not simply an international trade issue
and/or labor issue. To be clear, runaway production definitely entails
international trade and labor issues, which have been pursued by the
17U.S. government, commentators and private citizens. However, my
position is that the use by foreign governments of their tax laws to
alter the behavior of taxpayers not based in their country (in this case,
to attract capital investments, loans and expenditures to their
countries, i.e., runaway production) affects the U.S. tax code
(specifically, U.S. international tax laws), and therefore, indicates the
need for an active response by the U.S. government, which should
entail a review of, and possible amendment of, its international tax
laws to account for the monies received by U.S.-based MNCs from
foreign MPIs." The primary way foreign governments have attracted
foreign investment to their countries via runaway production is
through their tax laws and enforcement of those tax laws by their
collection agencies. The process supports a conclusion that runaway
production is a tax issue. Of course, there are many different types of
tax incentives offered by nations around the world, each providing
unique benefits and having different requirements." A company
seeking to access tax incentives such as those offered in Canada,
Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia are required to
file an income tax return in the appropriate country in order to be
eligible to receive the benefit of that country's film and television tax
37. See infra Part IV.
38. Whether this position will remain valid when a foreign government pays a direct
subsidy to a U.S. producer to runaway rather than using their tax code to affect the
incentive will take further research to determine.
39. Film Financing and Television Programming: A Taxation Guide, KPMG (Nov.
2009), https://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/
film-financing-and-television-programming.pdf.); see also DEP'T OF COMM., MIGRATION
OF FILMS, supra note 9, at 71-85 (discussing tax incentives of other countries);
Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 10, at Appendix A (providing a detailed examination
of the Canadian Provincial tax incentives as of 2002); see also Production Incentives,
ENTERTAINMENT PARTNERS, http://www.entertainment partners.comlincentives/ (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014) (providing information on twenty-eight foreign jurisdictions that
provide production incentives, the types of incentives and basic requirements to obtain the
incentives).
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incentive in accordance with those countries' tax laws. For example,
to claim the Federal Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit a
qualified corporation must file a corporation income tax return with
the Canada Revenue Agency with proper supporting
documentation.' Similar revenue agencies in Ireland, the United
Kingdom, France, and Australia process the film and tax incentives in
those and other countries which provide tax incentives.4 1 Once again,
the fact that foreign tax incentives operate through foreign tax codes
and enforcement agencies indicates that the process is a tax issue
subject to tax analysis. In a certain sense, the fact that these tax issues
fall within "runaway" film and television production is not
determinative, that is, an analysis of their effect on U.S. international
tax policy would be indicated if the foreign tax incentives were
provided to other U.S.-based MNCs, for example, MNCs in the
computer and electronic industry or the apparel industry.
E. Tax Expenditure Versus Tax Revenue
Professor Stanley Surrey defines "tax expenditures" as a
government's use of its tax code for purposes other than reaching an
appropriate normative baseline of net income.42 There have been
many articles written that focus on the difficulty of determining what
tax items are properly accounted for within the normative baseline of
income tax (revenue) and which tax items are properly categorized as
''revenue losses attributable to [tax] laws which allow a special
exclusion, exemption or deduction from gross income or which
40. How to Claim Your Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit, CAN.
REVENUE AGENCY, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/nnrsdnts/flm/ftc-cip/clm-eng.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014) (Among the supporting documents required to be filed with the
taxpayer's Form T2 Corp. Income Tax Return is Form T1131, a Canada Revenue Agency
form required to be completed to claim the Canadian film or video production tax credit.).
41. See Claiming a Film Tax Offset, AUSTL. Gov'T: AUSTL. TAXATION OFFICE,
http://www.ato.gov.aullndividuals/Ind/Film-industry-incentives-2012-13/?default=&page=
7#Claiminga_filmtax offset (last updated June 28, 2013) (administering the Federal film
and television incentives in Australia); FPC60010-Claims: How Relief Is Claimed, HM
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/fpcmanual/FPC 60010.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014).
42. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
REFORM (2d ed. 1973); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017, JCS-1-13 (Joint Comm. Print 2013)
[hereinafter ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 2013] (The Congressional
Budget Office and the U.S. Treasury have published a list of tax expenditures every year
since 1974.); Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, Address to
the Chicago-Kent College of Law Federal Tax Institute 7 (May 1, 2008) [hereinafter
Kleinbard, Address].
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provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax or a deferral of tax
liability."43
Professor Edward Kleinbard succinctly frames the problem when he
states:
Tax expenditure analysis has always been controversial, and
there is today a voluminous literature criticizing its premises
and implementation as a tool of tax policy ... critics argue
that the ideal 'normal' tax system from which tax expenditures
are identified does not correspond to any generally accepted
formal definition of net income.44
For purposes of this article, evaluating the U.S. international tax
policy implications of foreign MPIs does not require entering into
debates about tax expenditure theory. The fact that incentives for
film and television production are provided via those other countries'
tax codes render those foreign incentives subject to U.S. international
tax policy analysis whether or not those tax incentives fulfill any
definition of tax expenditures. Regardless, there is a strong argument
that film and television production incentives provided through
foreign (and the domestic, i.e., U.S.) tax codes are added as special
tax preferences and not to determine what is properly net income for
income tax purposes,45 which has implications regarding the remedies
43. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 2013, supra note 42.
44. Kleinbard, Address supra note 42, at 7.
45. See generally E&B Data, Effects of Foreign Location Shooting on the Canadian
Film and Television Industry, CANADIAN HERITAGE 2, 73 (Mar. 2010), http://en.eb
data.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/PC-Shooting-A.pdf (stating "[f]oreign location
shooting activities are deemed desirable by federal and provincial governments, which
treat these activities beneficially by offering tax credits to production companies."). The
report concludes with the observation that:
Foreign location shooting activity ... [exceeding] $1 billion in Canada for
more than ten years . .. also ties in with the notion of foreign direct
investment, not so much by the aspect of foreign ownership but by the
aspect of foreign capital injection. This injection of capital takes the
form of local spending and is characterized by jobs [labour for actual
shoots, but also supplier activities,] value added [contribution to GDP,]
and a contribution to public finances. For that reason, attracting foreign
location shooting is desirable in the view of public authorities [federal,
provincial and local] in Canada as elsewhere .... To the extent that the
net fiscal benefits exceed tax expenditures [in the form of tax credits] and
that the benefits do not kick in until local spending has actually occurred,
the benefit for governments seems self-evident.
Id.; OXFORD ECONOMICS, supra note 25, at 50-52 (2012). In part:
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[T]he current Film Tax Relief came into force on 1 January 2007 and is
based on an enhanced deduction from taxable income for film
production companies that can be converted into a payable tax
credit.... Film Tax Relief was extended at the end of 2011 to 2015
following the extension of the European Commission's ("EC") State Aid
approval of the Government's application to extend the duration of the
scheme. As noted by Film Minister Ed Vaizey, at the time of the
announcement, "Film Tax Relief is at the heart of our drive to support
the production of culturally British Films within a sustainable and vibrant
industry" .... In reviewing the Film Tax Relief, the Treasury considered
carefully the rationale for particular support for the film industry....
Film Tax Relief plays a key role in attracting large, internationally
mobile productions from the USA to the UK and Europe. Competition
to attract film producers to shoot films in North America and non-
European destinations ... is fierce .. . a key element is the availability of
tax relief. The use of the tax system to support film production is
widespread, including in individual US states and countries that benefit
from lower labour and other costs, such as South Africa and New
Zealand.... Given that the film industry is highly internationally
mobile and dominated by the U.S. major studios, the Film Tax Relief is
important in leveling the terms on which the UK can compete with other
global locations in attracting both inward investment productions and
subsequent postproduction work.
Id; see also CMPA 2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 76-77, stating:
Canada's ability to mitigate the effects of the rising dollar is a testament to
the quality of its crews and infrastructure and the ability of provincial
governments to respond quickly with enhanced incentives for foreign
producers . . . . The enhanced incentives introduced by many Canadian
provinces over the last five years have also helped to maintain Canada's
competitiveness in the increasingly globalizing location-production market.
Id. The report further notes that:
In a bid to restore its level of FLS production to the volumes reached in
the early 2000s, Ontario expanded its tax credit in June 2009 beyond
qualifying labour expenditures to also include non-labour expenditures
[an all-spend tax credit]. This initiative appears to have helped the
province buck the trend towards lower FLS production levels in Canada.
Id. See also Boryskavich & Bowler, supra note 10, at 34; NEIL CRAIG ASSOCS., supra note
10, at 6 ("The federal and provincial governments provide financial subsidies, tax
incentives... and other policy tools ... to help level the playing field for Canadian
producers and distributors in face of tremendous competitive advantage enjoyed by film
and television producers in the U.S. and elsewhere."). Regarding U.S. film and tax
incentives, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis
Be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and its
Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010) (describing the U.S. manufacturing incentive in
Internal Revenue Code section 199). "This provision was enacted in 2004, not for the
purpose of more accurately defining income, but expressly to 'make investments in
domestic manufacturing facilities more attractive' and to 'assist in the creation and
preservation of U.S. manufacturing jobs."' Id. (citing JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
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that have been pursued by the U.S. federal and state governments so
far' as well as possible future solutions.47 To be clear, whether or not
the U.S. and foreign MPIs satisfy a definition of "tax expenditures"
does not alter the inquiry or conclusions of this article, but is only
included to illustrate that a government's use of its tax code for
reasons other than to raise revenue is well-documented and
critiqued.48
III.Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons
A. Overview of Public Policy Tools
Runaway film and television production has been identified as a
public policy issue in the United States,49 evinced by the fact that the
U.S. government and many state governments have enacted laws-
primarily tax laws-to address this issue.o Professor Evert Vedung
has written that when a government is faced with a public policy
issue, it has various tools it can use." He has identified three
categories within which government public policy tools can be
placed.52 The first set of tools is economic, the second is regulatory,
and the third is informational, or more popularly labeled "the carrot,
the stick, and the sermon."" When attempting to change the
behavior of a nation "the government may either force us, pay us or
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS,
JCS-5-05 (Joint Comm. Print 2005)).
46. See supra Part II.E.
47. See infra Part IV.A.3 and Part VI.D.3.
48. It also raises the question of what is the proper role of I.R.C. §§ 181 and 199
regarding their ability to eradicate runaway production. See infra Part VI.D.3.
49. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9, at i:
Last year, the Department of Commerce was asked to examine the flight of
U.S. television and cinematic film production to foreign shores. In
September 2000, Commerce received an additional urgent request from a
bipartisan group of Members of Congress to ensure that the final report
address the following issues.
Id; see also supra Part II.
50. See infra Part IV.
51. Evert Vedung, Policy Instruments: Typologies and Theories, in CARROTS, STICKS,
AND SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR EVALUATION 28-29 (Marie-Louise
Bemelmans-Videc et al. eds. 2007) [hereinafter Vedung, Policy Instruments] (Professor Vedung
bases his three categories on Etizoni's classification of power: coercive, remunerative and
normative.).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 29-30.
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have us pay, or persuade us."M Professor Vedung's analysis refines
the common definitions and categories by adding subcategories to
carrots and sticks, providing examples to illustrate further differences
between each category." The goal of Part III is to outline a basic
framework for possible policy actions suggested by Professor Vedung
in order to be able to identify and categorize the actions the federal
and state governments have taken thus far to address the problem of
runaway production, then to use the paradigm, where applicable, in
order to propose solutions to the runaway problem within U.S.
international tax policy provided in Part VI.
B. Carrots
Obviously, a carrot is a reward to a party who engages in behavior
that is desired by a government. Those who receive carrots are
placed in a better position than if they had not received them, thereby
reducing the cost of engaging in the behavior desired by the
government." A government's goal is achieved when the future
decisions of the affected parties reflects government's policy goals,
but implementation comes at a cost because it generally reduces
government tax receipts. Consequently, as Professor Vedung
explains, economic provisions, also called carrots, can be either
54. Id. at 30. The use of carrots and/or sticks has been examined in the academic
literature in other areas of the law. See generally Brian D. Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and
Salience 290 (Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, 2013) [hereinafter Galle,
Salience]; Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of
Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797 (2012) [hereinafter Galle, The Tragedy of the
Carrots] (wherein he provides a background on the use of the terms carrots and sticks in
policy literature); Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards
Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
331 (2003); Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities, 17 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997). In the academic law literature examining areas of law other
than runaway production or tax, the definition of carrots basically mirrors Professor
Vedung's definition of "positive carrots" in addition to reaching certain other parallel
conclusions with Professor Vedung. However, the definition of sticks in academic law
literature does not precisely or uniformly match Professor Vedung's definition and only
one of the academic law literature articles addresses sermons, electing to categorize it
under sticks.
55. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 31-48.
56. Id. at 32. For a similar definition of carrots see Galle, Salience, supra note 54, at
6, 7; Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots, supra note 54, at 801 (examining externality
remedies); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law In an Era of Ubiquitous
Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711-12 (2008) (examining carrots and
sticks in the context of government's control of information); see generally Zagaris, supra
note 53, at 332.
57. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 32; see Galle, Salience, supra note
54, at 6, 7; Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots, supra note 54, at 801.
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positive or negative." In essence, these "economic policy instruments
involve either the handing out or the taking away of material
resources, be they in cash or in kind."" Positive carrots (economic
incentives) are provided by a government to improve the economic
situation of the recipient, thereby reducing the costs of the activity,
and negative carrots (economic disincentives) are financial
disincentives designed to place the target actor in a less advantageous
economic situation, thereby increasing the costs involved with the
targeted activity." Examples of economic incentives include cash
transfers, cash grants, subsidies and tax expenditures (exemptions,
write-offs, credits); examples of disincentives are taxes, charges, fees,
custom duties, and tariffs." The government's goal of changing the
behavior of the affected parties remains constant whether positive or
negative economic incentives are used, the difference is in the cost to
the government.62
As noted, incentives have a price which must be paid by the
government whether or not the government reaches the goal of
changing the target party's actions. As such, a criticism of positive
carrots is that they can be cost inefficient because they provide an
incentive for a party to act in a manner that the party would act even
without the economic subsidization.63 It is also important to note that
if a government decides to discontinue a positive carrot, then the
government's action is neither properly characterized as a negative
carrot, nor is it properly identified as a stick within Professor
Vedung's definitions. Rather, the government is deciding to no
longer subsidize that activity or those parties who no longer receive
58. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 43 (Carrots generally reduce
government tax receipts and the reduction or elimination of a carrot can increase tax
revenues.); see Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots, supra note 54, at 811; see also Giuseppe
Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 365 (2010) for an empirical analysis of the issue.
59. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 32.
60. Id. at 43; but see Galle, Salience, supra note 54, at 6, 7 (defining negative carrots as
sticks).
61. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 44; see generally Frans L. Leeuw,
The Carrot: Subsidies as a Tool of Government-Theory and Practice, in CARROTS, STICKS,
AND SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR EVALUATION (Marie-Louise
Bemelmans-Videc et al. eds. 2007) [hereinafter Leeuw].
62. Leeuw, supra note 61 at 78-79.
63. Id. at 79; see also Frans C.J. van der Doelen, The "Give and Take" Packaging of
Policy Instruments: Optimizing Legitimacy and Effectiveness, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND
SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR EVALUATION 138 (Marie-Louise
Bemelmans-Videc et al. eds. 2007) (citing BRUNO S. FREY, DEMOCRATIC ECONOMIC
POLICY: A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION (1983)) [hereinafter Frans C.J. van der Doelen] .
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the positive carrot. This is a subtle but important point, since once a
party receives an incentive it then often becomes a baseline of
expectations for that party. This makes removal difficult even if such
policy instruments are not achieving the goals that motivated its
implementation-that is, not addressing the issue they were intended
to address. A government may discontinue a positive carrot for
various reasons, but the public policy goal is to discontinue the
subsidy when the identified public policy issue is solved through the
use of such instrument. Of course, if a policy problem persists after a
positive carrot has been in place for a reasonable amount of time,
then it should indicate that a reevaluation of the public policy
instruments is warranted, especially where there is reduced tax
revenue.
Professor Vedung further differentiates carrots from sticks when
he points out that both positive and negative carrots provide actors
the ability to choose whether or not to engage in the activity subject
to the carrots. In contrast, sticks (discussed below) require
conformity and often subject a violator to a penalty or fine for failure
to conform to the stick." Unlike sticks, positive and negative carrots
simply adjust the costs of engaging in an activity; they neither
prescribe nor prohibit the affected actions." For example, Internal
Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") section 181 allowed a taxpayer to deduct up
to $15 million in qualifying film and television production costs in the
years the costs are incurred instead of capitalizing the costs and
deducting them over a number of future years." Providing a taxpayer
a current year deduction rather than requiring smaller deductions
over many future years is a positive carrot because of the time value
of money. I.R.C. section 181 decreases present value of the cost of
spending funds on film and television costs for the taxpayer choosing
to spend funds on such costs (assuming the other requirements of
I.R.C. section 181 are satisfied). Under I.R.C. section 181, a taxpayer
neither is required to spend funds on qualifying film and television
costs nor is prohibited from expending funds on such costs. In fact, a
taxpayer that expends funds on such qualifying costs is not even
required to elect to currently deduct the costs but may choose to
continue capitalizing and deducting the costs over many future
64. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 31-32.
65. Id. at 32.
66. I.R.C. § 181 (2013). I.R.C. § 181 ended as of December 31, 2013, and as of the
time of the writing of this article it is not known if it will be extended.
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years." The costs of the activity, here spending funds on film and
television production, have been altered by the tax code provision,
but taxpayers can exercise choices to engage or not engage in such
affected activities. Even if engaged in such activities, they can choose
to utilize the current deduction or not." Of course, those taxpayers
choosing to utilize the current deduction are reducing the amount of
tax revenue available to the federal government subsidizing such
activity.69
C. Sticks
Professor Vedung defines regulatory instruments ("sticks") as a
government's use of "rules and directives which mandate receivers to
act in accordance with what is ordered in these rules and directives."70
Although Professor Vedung is focusing on the actions of governments
seeking to address public policy problems, it is important to note that
regulations have been widely accepted as necessary in market
economies that "require basic infrastructure to function efficiently."71
"[Market economies] need basic rules of the game which include, for
example, trade, incorporation, competition, intellectual property,
weights and measures, money supply and financial institutions."72
Professor Vedung differentiates his basic definition of sticks from
the more common definitions that contain a requirement for negative
consequences or threat of negative consequences if certain rules are
not followed. He points out that not all regulations are backed by
67. I.R.C. § 181(a)(1), (c)(1).
68. Id.
69. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, JCS-2-08 66 (Joint Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 2008].
70. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 31.
71. Donald Lemaire, The Stick: Regulation As a Tool of Government, in CARROTS,
STICKS, AND SERMONS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR EVALUATION 63-64 (Marie-
Louise Bemelmans-Videc et al. eds. 2007).
72. Id. at 64 (noting that government regulatory action is historically controversial
because it is often identified as ineffective, excessively costly and difficult to enforce
because they "address situations reasonably well managed by the forces of the
marketplace and liability law.").
73. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 31; see Galle, Salience, supra note
54, at 2 (defining stick in the context of externalities as a policy choice to "raise the price
of the externality-producing good."); Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots, supra note 54, at
800 (defining "stick" as a policy that "can make the externality producer worse off than
under the status quo."); Strahilevitz, supra note 56, at 1711 ("the 'stick' approach punishes
undesirable behavior (via criminal fines, civil liability, or the condemnatory use of the
bully pulpit.")).
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"fines, imprisonment or other types of punishment" which are but
one categorical means of enforcement.74  Professor Vedung's
definition of sticks differs from the common understanding of the
metaphor in that it encompasses a greater variety of rules and
directives.S More specifically, if parties are obligated to obey a rule,
it is a stick accompanied with a means of enforcement together with
some form of punishment. Considering the other side of the coin,
what would not be considered a regulation in the context of public
policy instruments? Professor Vedung answers this question by
stating that:
[P]ractically everything that governments undertake would
then be 'regulation.' However, that is not the way the term is
used in the present context where regulation is regarded as
just one of the wider variety of tools that governments have at
their disposal to exert power over the actions of their
citizens."
His point is that regulations must be defined and evaluated vis-i-vis
the other available public policy tools which, once properly defined
and categorized, assists in finding the proper, effective balance of
those tools to solve a problem.
Professor Vedung further differentiates sticks from carrots and
sermons by the degree of control involved within the regulations."
Laws that state what must be done by parties are positive sticks and
laws that mandate what parties cannot do are negative sticks? He
primarily focuses on regulations that prohibit actions (negative sticks)
which can range from "unconditional [absolute]" on one end of the
spectrum where the goal is complete elimination of the targeted
activity, to "obligation[s] to notify" on the opposite end of the
negative carrot spectrum where the goal is to allow an activity once
the proper authorities are simply notified of a party's intention to
* * 81
engage in the activity.
74. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 31.
75. Id. at 31-32.
76. Id. at 31.
77. Id. at 32.
78. Id. at 50-51.
79. Id. at 41-42.
80. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 41.
81. Id. at 42.
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A further important distinction that Professor Vedung makes is
the removal of taxes from the stick category, which is seemingly
counter-intuitive. If an action results in a tax that is an equivalent
amount of a fine for the same exact action, then it is arguable that
there is no difference between the tax and the fine since engaging in
the activity places the party in the same financial position-this of
course excludes the negative moral stigma which would accompany
being fined.' "We may justifiably ask where the authoritative
element of a tax program ends and the economic element begins.""
Professor Vedung bases his conclusion that a tax is a negative carrot
and not a stick on the ability of the actor to choose to engage in
activity that results in a tax and the inability to choose to engage in
that same activity if it is subject to a fine because it is prohibited." He
further supports his conclusion by pointing out that engaging in the
activity that results in a penalty or fine classifies the actor as an
outlaw rather than as an entrepreneur subject to a tax, which would
be a cost of doing business." This article take the position that the
public policy issue of runaway production is a tax issue which
removes sticks from the proposed reforms herein.
D. Sermons
"Sermons" is a metaphor commonly applied to the dissemination
of information regarding targeted activities and includes "measures
undertaken to influence addressees through the transfer of
knowledge, communication of reasoned argument, persuasion,
advice, moral appeals, and so on."" The issues and stated negative
effects of runaway production have not only been disseminated by the
U.S. government, state governments, private parties, and by
academicians, but they have also been extensively reported in popular
news outlets such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal,
The Los Angeles Times, and The Hollywood Reporter." Although it
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 32, 35-36.
85. Id. at 35.
86. But see infra Part IV.A.4.
87. Vedung, Policy Instruments, supra note 51, at 48.
88. Bernard Simon, Using Tariffs to Discourage Movie Production Outside U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/29/business/using-tariffs-to-
discourage-movie-production-outside-us.html; Andrea R. Vaucher, Using Trade Pacts to
Stem Loss of TV and Film Jobs to Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004), http://www.ny
times.com/2004/08/05/movies/using-trade-pacts-to-stem-loss-of-tv-and-film-jobs-to-canada.html;
Jeffrey Gettleman, Lawmakers Discuss Ways to Stem Runaway Production, L.A. TIMES
264 36:2
RUNAWAY FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION
is important to recognize information as a means within the policy
instruments of a government, sermons decrying runaway production
give rise to a conundrum. Producers are engaging in behavior that is
fundamental to U.S. economic philosophy, namely, that a producer
should pursue that course of action that minimizes costs and
maximizes revenue within the parameters of what is lawful." Further,
the broad U.S. policy in support of globalization has been cited as one
of the factors that has increased the rise of producers' choice of
foreign location for production." In the context of MNCs, they have a
duty to their shareholders to pursue such courses of action. The latter
is strengthened by the conclusion that MNCs are acting within the laws
of both the United States and foreign countries when they engage in
runaway production and when they use foreign MPIs.9' Further, the
parties engaging in runaway production, primarily U.S.-based MNCs,
are a relatively small number of motivated, well-informed citizens who
cannot be classified as ignorant of the relevant issues. Sermons,
therefore, do not provide governments with the leverage required to
affect the behavior of the producers engaging in runaway production
and are not a viable basis for addressing that particular issue.
(Jan. 20, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/j an/20/business/fi-55705; Ethan Smith,
Filmmakers Shoot For Breaks, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB1000142405270230350604577446773703322492; Daniel Miller, The Battle In
L.A. Against Runaway Production, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ news/battle-la-runaway-production-170092.
89. See infra Part IV.A.4, regarding the claims of certain parties that the MPIs
provided by foreign countries violate international trade laws.
90. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9, at 59 (Globalization
is "the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade
and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people [labor]
and knowledge [technology] across international borders") (citing IMF Staff,
Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Apr. 12,
2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm). See also
THE MONITOR REPORT, supra note 10, at 4; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1575-76
(discussing globalization in the context of worldwide tax competition).
91. See infra Part IV.A.4. regarding the claims of certain parties that the MPIs
provided by foreign countries violate international trade laws.
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IV. U.S. Responses to Foreign Film and
Television Tax Incentives Since 1997
Author and policy advisor Frans C.J. van der Doelen shrewdly
advised that:
In the abstract, the situation should not be that difficult. The
policymaker faces the emergence of a policy problem that
requires a policy response .... Should the response involve
subsidies, loans, regulations, direct service, penalties,
information, the use of force, or tax credits, to name but
eight .... The policymaker picks one, or a cluster of several,
to appropriately respond to the problem .... Implementation
takes place according to the blueprint for the selected
instrument. The problem is contained, maybe even solved,
and the policymaker moves on .... In reality, it seldom if
ever happens this way.'
A. U.S. Federal Government
1. The Monitor Report
Although Canada began offering tax advantages to producers
beginning in the 1980s, it was their enactment of the Film or Video
Production Services Tax Credit ("PSTC") in late 1997 that marked
the beginning of the current debate concerning runaway production.93
Recognizing the impact of this 1997 Canadian legislation, at the
beginning of 1999 entertainment labor groups, specifically, the Screen
Actors Guild ("SAG") and the Directors Guild of America
("DGA"), commissioned Monitor Company to investigate and
provide a report about the causes and impact of runaway film and
television production ("Monitor Report").9 By August 1999, the
U.S. House Ways and Means Committee was discussing making the
issue a priority to be addressed at the World Trade Organization
Ministerial Conference later that November.95 Putting aside the fact
92. Frans C.J. van der Doelen, supra note 63, at 131.
93. NEIL CRAIG AssOCS., supra note 10, at 10.
94. THE MONITOR REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
95. Objectives for the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting 1999, supra note 10, at 7-11.
The Hon. Jerry Weller, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois stated:
I want to reintroduce to the Subcommittee an issue that I brought before
the full Committee during the markup of the Financial Freedom Act of
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that the Monitor Report was commissioned by private labor groups
and could be considered biased, members of Congress nevertheless
referenced the analysis and the conclusions of the Monitor Report in
concluding that the proper response was for the U.S. government to
"level the playing field."6 The authors of the Monitor Report
concluded that there was a 25% cost production disadvantage by
filming in the United States rather than Canada, and that "[w]ithout a
meaningful response (or some unforeseen development abroad),
production employment opportunities and associated economic
benefits will continue to leave the United States at a significant
rate."" The Monitor Report did not propose a solution to the issue
but rather stated:
The solutions will not be simple because the causes are several
and very complex. However, the cost gap to be closed to
retain production in the U.S. may not be the entire 25%
production cost disadvantage ... if the budgets for U.S.
productions were brought to within 10% to 15% of costs in
Canada, then they [producers] would make the argument to
keep that production in the U.S.9"
The authors were seemingly inferring that the United States would be
wise to address the relative costs through its own tax incentives,
thereby reducing the costs of filming in the United States. However,
since the issue was framed in the context of international trade at the
time, discussions by members of Congress regarding the proposed
1999. The issue is the loss of 20,000 American film industry jobs from
runaway film production. I want to raise this issue to urge that our
domestic film industry be given a seat at the table at the WTO talks in
Seattle to address the cultural content issue and its relationship to
runaway film production.
Id. Weller further stated that he introduced legislation during the committee discussion
on the Financial Freedom Act of 1999 providing a wage based tax credit and creative
financing tax incentives to counter the loss of film production jobs to Canada. Id. The
Ministerial Conference is a meeting where high-level international trade decisions are
made by representatives of each country that is a member of the World Trade
Organization. Id.
96. Objectives for the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting 1999, supra note 10, at 7-8, 10,
22 (The Hon. Jerry Weller, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois stated,
"The United States shouldn't be put in a competitive disadvantage by tax incentives
offered abroad. Rather we need to level the playing field for the small businesses
impacted by the runaway production and create jobs in America, for Americans.").
97. THE MONITOR REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
98. Id.
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agenda for the 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial meeting
centered on whether or not Canada's tax incentives were illegal under
existing trade laws." The issue was reviewed at this time in terms of
sticks, namely, whether foreign tax incentives violated the rules of
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and the United States'
remedies to such claimed rules violations.
2. The U.S. Department of Commerce Report Triggers Positive Carrots
The U.S. government subsequently commissioned its own study
which the Department of Commerce provided in a report issued in
2001 ("Commerce Report").'" The Commerce Report concluded by
noting that "a wide variety of private and public sector actions ha[ve]
been suggested" but urged further study of the proposals even though
"industry observers have proposed that the United States or
individual states offer comparable tax incentives to encourage
production in the United States.""o' Despite the potential trade issue
rule violations, the first public policy instrument on the U.S.
government's agenda was positive carrots provided through
enactment of federal tax laws.'" Four months after the release of the
Commerce Report in 2001, legislation was introduced (and
reintroduced in 2003) in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate to amend the I.R.C. This legislation proposed a tax credit of
25% for the first $25,000 of "qualified wages" paid or incurred by an
99. OBJECTIVES FOR THE WTO SEATTLE MINISTERIAL MEETING 1999, supra note
10, at 21 (stating that the members of Congress discussed whether they "hear[d] the drums
beating pretty loudly" about section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974); see also Memorandum
from Alan Dunn & Bill Fennell to the Film & Television Action Comm. on a Brief
Comparison of Section 301 and Special 301 Trade Laws (Apr. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.ftac.net/7-Special_301.pdf [hereinafter Dunn & Fennell]:
Section 301 may be used to respond to violations under bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements that deny U.S. rights under those
agreements. Section 301 also may be used to respond to unreasonable,
unjustifiable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that burden
or restrict U.S. commerce even if those practices do not violate the
explicit terms of an international agreement.
Id.
100. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MIGRATION OF FILMS, supra note 9.
101. Id., supra note 9, at 89; see also KATZ, 2001 PRODUCTION REPORT, supra note
10, at 13 ("The U.S. production industry has daunting choices: match the incentives; find
ways that are noninvasive, non-punitive to the producer to stop foreign subsidies or accept
the fact that the U.S. production industry is in a serious decline that will have ramifications
for years to come.").
102. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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employer with respect to each "qualified employee" in any "qualified
U.S. independent film and television production" each tax year."
The proposed legislation was referred to the appropriate sub-
committees of the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance
Committees, but was never enacted.'' It is unknown why the first
attempts to pass federal legislation failed, but it has been opined that
it was based on a dispute regarding the extent of runaway production
as a public policy problem and the perception that the proposed
positive carrots would be "corporate welfare" for studios.105
3. Federal Legislation-More Positive Carrots
New federal legislation affecting the runaway film problem was
drafted and enacted in 2004 through I.R.C. amendments." The
legislation provided the newly created positive carrots found in
I.R.C. sections 181 and 199.'" I.R.C. section 181 accelerates cost
recovery by allowing a taxpayer to deduct qualifying film and
television production costs in the years the costs are incurred instead
of capitalizing the costs and deducting them over a number of future
years.'" I.R.C. section 181 was specifically enacted to address
runaway film production and federal legislators believed it would
"encourage producers to bring feature film and television production
projects to cities and towns across the United States, thereby
103. U.S. Indep. Film and Television Prod. Incentive Act of 2001, H.R. 3131, 107th
Cong. (2001); U.S. Indep. Film and Television Prod. Incentive Act of 2003, H.R. 715,
108th Cong. (2003); U.S. Indep. Film and Television Prod. Incentive Act of 2001, S. 1278,
107th Cong. (2002); U.S. Indep. Film and Television Prod. Incentive Act of 2003, S. 1613,
108th Cong. (2004); see also Ulich & Simmens, supra note 10, at 357. The authors further
state that:
To rectify the problems of runaway productions, legislation at the local,
state and federal levels is paramount .... Amid encouraging signs that a
tax bill of significant consequence is likely to pass Congress in the coming
months, it is imperative that the creative community take a proactive
position to ensure that the tax bill provides incentives for domestic film
production.
Id. at 369.
104. H.R. 3131; H.R. 715; S. 1278; S. 1613.
105. Ferguson, supra note 10, at 132 (citing David M. Halbfinger, California Considers Tax
Breaks For Filming, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/108/18/movies/
18ru na.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).
106. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
107. I.R.C. § 181 (2013); I.R.C. § 199 (2004).
108. I.R.C. § 181.
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decreasing the runaway production problem.',to The U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance cited the Department of Commerce Report in
concluding that it made a "compelling case that runaway film and
television production has eroded important segments of a vital
American industry.".o
On the other hand, I.R.C. section 199, which allows a taxpayer a
deduction equal to a portion of the taxpayer's qualified production
activities income, was not passed specifically to address runaway film
production. Rather, it was implemented to mitigate possible effects
of the mandatory repeal of certain U.S. tax laws that were ruled to be
export subsidies prohibited by the World Trade Organization
("WTO")."' The new I.R.C. section 199 was enacted to "reduce the
tax burden on domestic manufacturers, including small businesses
engaged in manufacturing," which includes many other
manufacturers in addition to film and television producers."2
Although I.R.C. section 199 is a positive carrot that film and
television producers can utilize, it cannot be properly characterized as
the federal government's attempt to specifically address runaway film
production since the stated objective of passing I.R.C. section 199 was
to assist the economic recovery from the "recent economic downturn"
in light of the mandatory repeal of the U.S. tax export subsidies."'
Therefore, it is arguable that once those goals are met, the underlying
reasons for enacting I.R.C. section 199 shall be eliminated thereby
supporting a repeal of the tax incentive regardless of the repeal's
impact on the runaway production problem.
Regardless of the intentions behind the passage of these two tax
code sections, they are positive carrots with the purpose of making
U.S. "manufacturing, service, and high-technology businesses and
workers more competitive and productive both at home and
abroad."" 4 In addition, both laws are available to film and television
producers.
But how much revenue has been forfeited by the U.S. government
in order to achieve the stated goals? This is not an easy question to
109. COMM. ON FIN., JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH ("JOBS") Act, S. REP.
No. 108-192, at 74 (2003).
110. Id. at 73-74.
111. Id. at 7, 8, 11.
112. Id. at 11.
113. Id.
114. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
115. Id.
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answer. The cost of I.R.C. section 181 is clear, but the cost of I.R.C.
section 199 as specifically attributed to film and television production
is not. The Joint Committee on Taxation prepares an annual report
estimating federal tax expenditures."' The reports released between
2005 and 2011 estimated that the federal government provided less
than $100 million in lost revenue each year attributable to corporate
taxpayers' utilization of I.R.C. section 181."' The same report
estimated that between 2005 and 2011, the U.S. government incurred
an average annual amount of $3.96 billion in lost revenue from I.R.C.
section 199. However, this is the total amount from all qualified
manufacturers; the percentage of the annual amount attributable to
qualified films produced by eligible U.S. taxpayers is unknown."' As
a point of reference, the Canadian federal government has expended
approximately $300 million per year for film and television positive
carrots between 2005 and 2011, while the U.S. federal government
has provided an average annual amount in excess of $27.9 billion for
the top ten categories of corporate tax expenditures between 2005
and 2009.119 The U.S. government has provided positive carrots to
116. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES 2013, supra note 42, at 2:
Tax expenditures include any reductions in income tax liabilities that
result from special tax provisions or regulations that provide tax benefits
to particular taxpayers.... Estimates of tax expenditures are prepared
for use in budget analysis. They are a measure of the economic benefits
that are provided through the tax laws to various groups of taxpayers and
sectors of the economy. The estimates also may be useful in determining
the relative merits of achieving specific public goals through tax benefits
or direct outlays.
Id.
117. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2011-2015, JCS-1-12 (Joint Comm. Print 2005); JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014,
JCS-3-10 (Joint. Comm. Print 2010); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED.
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, JCS-1-10 (Joint Comm. Print 2010);
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2008-2012, JCS-2-08 (Joint Comm. Print 2008); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014, JCS-3-07 (Joint
Comm. Print 2007); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, JCS-2-06 (Joint Comm. Print 2006);
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2008-2012, JCS-1-05 (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
118. Id.
119. CAN. DEP'T OF FIN., TAX EXPENDITURES AND EVALUATIONS 24 (2012); CAN.
DEP'T OF FIN., TAX EXPENDITURES AND EVALUATIONS 23-25 (2009) (containing
"Estimates" and "Projections" of "Corporate Income Tax Expenditures" for tax years
2005 through 2009); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TAX
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address runaway production while the Canadian government has
annually averaged approximately $200 million more than the U.S.
government.12 Further, the U.S. government in that timeframe has
annually allocated approximately $23.9 billion to the top ten
categories of tax expenditures other than those provided under I.R.C.
sections 181 and 199.2" Based on the aggregate and relative amounts
of positive carrots provided by the U.S. government, it is hard to
escape the conclusion that it has not provided positive carrots in
amounts that evince it has prioritized these public policy instruments
as a solution to the runaway production problem.
4. Petition Filed with the U.S. Trade Representative Under Section 301(a) of
the Trade Act of 1974-A Stick
The House Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on
Ways and Means initial inquiry over whether "what the Canadians
are doing is illegal under existing trade law" was subsequently
pursued by academics and private citizens.'22 In 2001, the Film and
Television Action Committee ("FTAC") filed a petition under
section 701 of the 1930 Tariff Act with the Department of Commerce
requesting that the Department "initiate an investigation into
whether countervailing duties should be imposed on the imports of
subsidized feature films into the U[nited] S[tates]." The obvious
reference was to Canada's film subsidies.'" The FTAC withdrew its
petition when the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA")
filed a motion in opposition.24 On September 4, 2007, the FTAC filed
a petition under section 301(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 with the
Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
requesting that the USTR initiate a WTO action.125 The FTAC made
this request based on a claim that Canada's economic subsidies to
film and television production violated Canada's obligations under
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE
ESTIMATES, JCX-15-11-24 (Joint Comm. Print 2011).
120. See notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
121. The total amount of $23.9 billion is less the total amounts provided under I.R.C.
§§ 181 and 199.
122 Objectives for the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting 1999, supra note 10, at 21
(Representative Richard Neal asked Representative Jerry Weller, "Mr. Weller, is it your
belief that what the Canadians are doing is legal under existing trade law?"); Wright, supra
note 10; Lee, supra note 10; Turco, supra note 10; Dunn & Fennell, supra note 99.




the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.'26
The USTR concluded:
Based on a thorough review of the economic data, other facts,
and legal arguments set out in the petition, the interagency
committee unanimously recommended that the USTR not
accept the petition because a dispute based on the information
and arguments set out in the petition would not be effective in
addressing the Canadian subsidies.'27
Although the U.S. federal government has identified runaway
production as an issue to be addressed, it has so far declined to pursue
remedies through international trade laws.
It is also important to note the position of the MPAA regarding
foreign tax incentives. The MPAA has taken the position that
Canadian film and television incentives are not inconsistent with the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures." The
MPAA is comprised of MNCs that benefit from foreign MPIs,
namely, the six major U.S. motion picture studios-Walt Disney
Studios Motion Picture, Paramount Pictures Corporation, Sony
Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, Universal City Studios LLC, and Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc.129
B. Individual U.S. States: More Positive Carrots
1. Amount of Film and Television Tax Incentives Provided by Individual States
In 2003, five states in America provided a total of $2 million in
film and television tax incentives. This increased to forty states
providing approximately $1.4 billion in film and television incentives
in 2010.30 It was reported that between 2001 and 2010 individual
states with such policies provided a total amount of approximately $6
billion, with almost $4 billion provided between 2007 and 2010.13' By
way of comparison, three provinces of Canada that represented over
90% of the tax incentives provided by all provinces in 2003 reported
126. Id.; see also Dunn & Fennell, supra note 99.
127. Press Release, Gretchen Hamel, supra note 10.
128. Wright, supra note 10, at 802.
129. Frequently Asked Questions, MPAA, available at http://www.mpaa.org/faq; see
supra Part II.C.
130. Henchman, supra note 10.
131. Id.
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that they provided a total amount of film and television incentives of
approximately $466 million in that year alone. 2 Between 2001 and
132. BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2010/11-
2012/13148 (2010); BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN
2009/10-2011/12 126 (2009); BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND
FISCAL PLAN 2008/09-2010/11 174 (2008); BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2007/08-2009/10 140 (2007); BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2006/07-2008/09 127 (2006); BRITISH COLUMBIA
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2005/06-2007/08 153 (2005); BRITISH
COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2004/05-2006/07 136 (2004);
BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN 2003/04-2005/06
116 (2003); BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND FISCAL PLAN
2002/03-2004/05 132 (2002); BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUDGET AND
FISCAL PLAN 2001/02-2003/04 118 (2001); Ontario Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review:
Transparency in Taxation, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2010), available at
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/fallstatement/2010/transparency.html; Ontario Economic
Outlook and Fiscal Review: Transparency in Taxation, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(2009), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/fallstatement/2009/transparency.html;
Ontario Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review: Transparency in Taxation, ONTARIO MINISTRY
OF FINANCE (2008), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/fallstatement/2008/08fs-
annex5.html; Ontario Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review: Transparency in Taxation,
ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2007), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/
budget/fallstatement/2007/07fs-annex5.html; Ontario Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review:
Transparency in Taxation ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FINANCE (2006), available at
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/fallstatement/2006/06fs-papere.html; Ontario Economic
Outlook and Fiscal Review: Transparency in Taxation, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FINANCE
(2008), available at http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/fallstatement/2005/05fs-paperc.html
(2001 through 2004 not available); MINISTtRE DES FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES
A.27 (2010); MINISTARE DES FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES A.27 (2009);
MINISTLRE DES FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES A.29 (2008); MINISTtRE DES
FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES A.29 (2007); MINISTARE DES FINANCES, QUEBEC
TAX EXPENDITURES A.28 (2006); MINISTERE DES FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES
27 (2005); MINISTERE DES FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES 29 (2003); MINISTPRE
DES FINANCES, QUEBEC TAX EXPENDITURES 25 (2000); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 140 (2010); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 136 (2009); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 52 (2008); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 50 (2007); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 44 (2006); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 48 (2005); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 44 (2004); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 38 (2003); SASKATCHEWAN MINISTER OF
FINANCE, PROVINCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATES 35 (2002); (2000 and 2001 tax credit not
available); MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS Cl
(2010); MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS D21 (2009);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS C1 (2008);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS Cl (2007);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS D18 (2006);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS D1 (2005);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS D1 (2004);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS D1 (2002);
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS Dl (2001);
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2010, the five provinces of Canada providing over 95% of the
provincial tax incentives reported that they provided a total amount
of approximately $4.9 billion, with approximately $3.88 billion
provided between 2007 and 2010."3 The latter expenditures by
Canada are limited to providing a broad reference regarding the
decisions of Canadian provincial governments because expenditures
in certain years were not reported by certain provinces and, further,
the exact amounts of the available incentives that were accessed by
U.S. runaway productions are unknown. Nevertheless, it is a
reasonable conclusion that a relatively competitive amount of
available film and television tax incentives were available between
2007 and 2010 from individual states in America vis-A-vis the
Canadian provinces, marked by a dramatic increase in the amount
available from individual U.S. states beginning in 2007.
2. State Film and Television Tax Incentives Have Been Expensive and Have
Not Solved Runaway Production
Since 2010, academic articles and articles by private research
organizations have questioned the wisdom of individual U.S. states'
billion-dollar expenditures for film and television tax incentives."
These articles often rely on studies published by the state
governments that began appearing in 2005, with conclusions that the
economic benefits of the film and tax incentives provided by each
such respective state's legislature are significantly outweighed by the
costs.' There are a number of reasons the studies and articles have
reached similar conclusions about the costs versus benefits of film and
television incentives provided by individual states. What is relevant
for this article is whether the amounts collectively offered by the
states reduced the number of runaway productions. Unfortunately,
no available study provides a concrete answer to this question.
MANITOBA MINISTER OF FINANCE, BUDGET: TAXATION ADJUSTMENTS 1 (2000) (no film
and tax credit reported in 2003); not available for the province of Alberta.
133. Id.
134. McDonald, Down the Rabbit Hole, supra note 10, at 109; Schonauer, supra note
10; Luther, supra note 10; TANNENWALD, supra note 10; Henchman, supra note 10.
135. See GREG ALBRECHT, STATE OF LA. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL OFFICE, FILM AND
VIDEO TAX INCENTIVES: ESTIMATED ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS 3, 6 (2005)
("[T]he economic benefits are not sufficient to provide tax receipts approaching a level
necessary to offset the costs of the tax credits that stimulated the increased film production
expenditures."); WISC. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF WISCONSIN
FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAM, supra note 10; COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., DEP'T OF
REVENUE, A REPORT ON THE MASSACHUSETTS FILM TAX INCENTIVES (2009); AN
ANALYSIS OF TEXAS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES, supra note 10.
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However, if U.S. film and tax incentives (positive carrots) are to be
considered a solution to runaway production then it would be a
reasonable position to expect that Canada would report a certain
amount of reduced FLS by U.S. producers between 2007 and 2010 as
a result of the dramatic increase of available film and television tax
incentives in the individual states. This is not what was reported by
Canada, that is, FLS in Canada. The percentage of FLS represented
by U.S. producers, remained relatively constant between 2007 and
2010."' As noted in Part III.B., it is a common criticism of positive
carrots that they provide incentives for a party to act in a manner in
which that party would have acted even if no incentives were
available."' As argued elsewhere, there are a finite number of studio
(MNC) films produced each year and that finite number will be
divided into those that undertake production within the United States
and those that decide to film outside the United States; any incentives
available within the United States will simply reduce the costs for
those films that are in the United States, but will not necessarily
influence the overall numbers of film and television productions that
plan to remain in the United States for production.'38 Positive carrots
provided to compete with foreign MPIs not only cost U.S. federal and
state governments by reducing tax receipts, they also have not solved
the runaway production problem.
V. U.S. International Tax Laws and Tax Avoidance
A. Background
The U.S. government and other researchers have been unanimous
in concluding that U.S.-based MNCs have avoided paying billions of
dollars in taxes to the United States annually."' Numerous studies
136. CMPA 2012 REPORT, supra note 22, at 78. (FLS was reported to be $1.433
billion in 2006-2007; $1.770 billion in 2007-2008; $1.445 billion in 2008-2009; $1.508 billion
in 2009-2010; and $1.874 billion in 2010-2011. The number of U.S. projects, determined
by copyright ownership, was not reportedly available for 2006-2007; 165 in 2007-2008; 158
in 2008-2009; 139 in 2009-2010; and 194 in 2010-2011).
137. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
138. Luther, supra note 10, at 12; TANNENWALD, supra note 10, at 7; McDonald,
Down the Rabbit Hole, supra note 10, at 89.
139. See PRESIDENT'S TAx REFORM, supra note 5; INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5; Hines, Tax Policy, supra note 5; Taxation New Evidence,
supra note 5; TAX HAVENS, supra note 5; Shapiro, supra note 5; Graetz, supra note 5;
Thompson, supra note 5; Barker, supra note 5; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Exemption
System, supra note 5; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Curtailing Deferral, supra note 5; Fleming,
Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5; Avi-Yonah, supra note 5.
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have shown how these taxpayers have been able to obtain such
favorable tax results." Subsidies provided by the U.S. government to
MNCs through the U.S. international tax laws and MNCs' ability to
successfully exploit the U.S. tax laws regarding their international
activities are two reasons often cited.14' Due to these reasons, there
have been numerous proposals to amend the U.S. international tax
laws and eliminate the positive carrots (subsidizations) imbedded
within the U.S. tax laws.142 Although subsidies have not been
identified as an international tax law problem, the following section
will reveal exactly how the problem of runaway production by MNCs
is an international tax issue.
Recognizing this, a White House press release in 2009
demonstrates that it is an important policy issue:
There is no higher economic priority for President Obama
than creating new, well-paying jobs in the United States. Yet
today, our tax code actually provides a competitive advantage
to companies that invest and create jobs overseas compared to
those that invest and create those same jobs in the [United
States]. In addition, our tax system is rife with opportunities
to evade and avoid taxes through offshore tax havens: In 2004,
the most recent year for which data is available, U.S.
multinational corporations paid about $16 billion of U.S. tax
on approximately $700 billion of foreign active earnings-an
effective U.S. tax rate of about 2.3 %.143
The bottom line is that the current U.S. tax laws already create an
economic advantage for MNCs to move capital, investments, and
operations outside the United States without piling on tax incentives
such as film and television production subsidies and rebates received
from foreign countries." U.S.-based MNCs exploit the differences
between U.S. and foreign tax laws in several ways. For example,




143. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Leveling the Playing
Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas
(May 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officelleveling-the-
playing-field-curbing-tax-havens-and-removing-tax-incentives-for-shifting-jobs-overseas.
144. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption,
supra note 5.
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through "deferral" and foreign tax credits; they take advantage of
their ability to mismatch foreign expenses with U.S. income, and they
take advantage of their ability to cross-credit foreign tax credits. The
salient feature is that the tax incentives for film and television
production obtained by a U.S.-based MNC from a foreign country
(i.e., for being a runaway production) represent money received from
the foreign government in addition to the tax benefits provided by the
U.S. government to MNCs' worldwide activities by virtue of current
subsidies. The degree to which MNCs have benefitted from tax
incentives for film and television production by transferring
production to foreign countries has been well documented.'45 What
must be examined is the way these MNCs exploit additional positive
carrots from the U.S. government via U.S tax laws, which encourage
them to move their capital, investments, and operations (i.e., runaway
production) to other countries.
This examination must begin by understanding that a government
can either tax its citizens on their worldwide income or solely on the
income that they earn within their own country.'" The U.S.'s system
provides that citizens (e.g., MNCs such as Walt Disney Co., Sony
Corp., CBS Corp., Comcast Corp., and News Corp.) are taxed based
on income they earn worldwide.4 7 There are countries that do not tax
their citizens based on their residence in that country, but rather,
based on the source of where the income is earned. That is, they only
tax their citizens on the income they earn in the home country,
effectively exempting from taxation the income they earn in other
countries.'" On the other hand, every country taxes income earned
within their country whether or not it is earned by a citizen or non-
citizen.149 So where income is earned serves as a basis for all countries
to tax both residents and non-residents doing business in their
145. See supra Part II.
146. The following overview of certain basic principles of U.S. international income taxation,
simplified for brevity and clarity see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON PRESENT LAW & SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
SuBcommfrEES TO THE TAX REFoRM WORKING GROUPS 223-260, JCS-3-13, (Joint Comm.
Print 2013) for a more comprehensive overview of the U.S. international tax laws.
147. I.R.C. § 11, § 7701 (2013) (Corporations incorporated in the United States are
residents subject to worldwide taxation by the United States); see generally Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25
VA. TAX REv. 313 (2005) for an overview of the development of U.S. international
taxation from 1918 to 2004.
148. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 1.
149. Clifton, Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5, at 401.
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country.so In essence, U.S. citizens are taxed twice on income earned
in other countries. They are taxed once by the United States based
on worldwide taxation, and again by the country in which it was
earned based on that country's claim to tax such income earned
within its borders. To eliminate this "double taxation", the United
States provides its citizens an income tax credit for U.S. taxes paid to
the foreign country equal to at most the amount that would be owed
under U.S. tax laws."' This tax credit is labeled the "foreign tax
credit" or "FTC."15 2,153  However, the foregoing system is not
applicable when a multinational corporation operates through a
subsidiary in a foreign country. In this situation, a parent U.S.-based
MNC does not pay tax on the foreign subsidiaries' earnings unless
and until the foreign subsidiary repatriates the earnings home, often
through a dividend to the parent MNC.'-" This aspect of U.S.
international tax laws is commonly called "deferral."
B. Deferral
The economic advantage of deferral accrues to a U.S.-based
MNC because of the time value of money; money that would
otherwise be paid to the U.S. government as taxes remains with the
foreign subsidiary so that the subsidiary can use it to earn more
money by reinvesting in new projects."' An example of how U.S.-
based MNCs in Canada are subsidized by deferral is illustrated in the
table below which is based on a table created by the Congressional
Budget Office.'
150. Id.
151. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 1.
152. Id.
153. Foreign Tax Credit ("FTC") should not be confused with the Federal Trade
Commission.
154. See I.R.C. §§ 11(d), 61(a)(7), 702, 875, 882, 884, 904(a), 951-62, 964-65 (2013).
155. UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 103
(2005).
156. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 7.
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Beore Tax Income millions of dollars)
If There Were No Current Law:
Deferral Deferral
U.S. Income 1000 1000
Foreign Income Before Foreign Taxes
Taxable income repatriated to the 500 500
parent company
Income reinvested abroad 500 500
Total Income 2000 1500
U.S. and Canada Tax Labilty and the Foregn Tax Credit
U.S. Income 1000 1000
U.S. Taxes Before Foreign Tax Credit
Rate (Percent) 35 35
Liability (millions of dollars) 700 525
Canada Taxes
Rate 26 26
Liability (millions of dollars) 260 130
US. and Canada Tax Liabii After the Credit
U.S. Taxes 440 395
Foreign Taxes 260 260
Total Taxes 700 655
In the above example, the foreign-owned subsidiaries based in
Canada obtain $45 million dollars of deferral in the current year to
reinvest in future projects. As of 2011, it is estimated that foreign-
owned subsidiaries have between $1 trillion and $1.5 trillion of
permanently reinvested earnings.' This raises the question as to
whether or not (and to what degree) U.S.-based MNCs presently
157. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 6 (citing $1.3 trillion based
on a study by JP Morgan); OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 11 ("Some analysts
estimate, on the basis of a review of the financial data of 880 companies, that as of May,
2011, unrepatriated foreign income totaled $1.4 trillion."); see also Susan C. Morse, A
Corporate Offshore Profits Transition Tax, 91 N.C. L. REV. 549, 594 (2013) (citing DAVID
ZION, AMIT VARSHNEY & NICOLE BURNAP, CREDIT SUISSE, PARKING EARNINGS
OVERSEAS 1 (2011) in which they estimated the amount to be $1.3 trillion).
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operating in Canada have been receiving the benefit of the positive
carrot provided by deferral. That U.S.-based MNCs in the film and
television industry have the potential to utilize the benefit of deferral
in Canada is made clear by a report that six foreign controlled
distributors obtained approximately $1.38 billion of the total
Canadian distribution revenues in 2009.1
Although deferral of taxes on foreign income is clearly a benefit
to recipients, the reasons why deferrals are provided to U.S-based
MNCs need to be explored to determine if deferral is in fact a
positive carrot in the U.S. tax code. Deferral is not a recent addition
to the I.R.C., but has been part of U.S. international tax policy since
1913. It was based on the initial rationale that taxes should not be
imposed on revenues until such funds were actually available to the
taxpayer."9 Beginning in the early 1960s deferral started to be
attacked as inefficient, unnecessary and expensive.'" However,
proponents of deferral argued that U.S.-based MNCs would be at a
competitive disadvantage against foreign MNCs when operating
outside of the United States."' Today the U.S. government and
commentators consider deferral an unsupportable position and have
158. NORDICITY, STUDY OF THE AUDIOVISUAL DISTRIBUTION SECTOR IN CANADA
6 (2011), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1358776472905/1358776512521 states that:
Foreign-controlled distributors in Canada include the six studios that
form the membership of the Canadian Motion Picture Distributors
Association (CMPDA): Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures,
Paramount Pictures Corp., Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios LLLP, and Warner
Bros. Revenue data by country-of-control is limited. In the 2006 to 2009
period, foreign-controlled distributors generated nearly three quarters of
the total distribution revenues in Canada, or $1.38 billion in 2009.
Id.
159. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 6; Jane G. Gravelle, Does the Concept of
Competitiveness Have Meaning in Formulating Corporate Tax Policy?, 65 TAX L. REV.
323, 327 n.16 (2012) (also providing a brief history of the tax laws allowing deferral).
160. Id; see also Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the
Right, Stuck in the Middle With Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1538-39 (2001) ("The
Kennedy Administration, with the guidance of Stanley Surrey as the Assistant Secretary of Tax
Policy, also proposed that deferral for U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries be largely eliminated so
that domestic investment would receive full tax parity with foreign investment.").
161. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 6; Engel, supra note 160, at 1540;
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Curtailing Deferral, supra note 5, at 468; JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, FACTORS AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, JCS-6-91, 244 (Joint Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, FACTORS].
20141 RUNAWAY FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION 281
proposed many reforms that would eliminate it for foreign income
earned by foreign subsidiaries of domestic companies.162
C. Foreign Tax Credits and Mismatching of Foreign Expenses with U.S. Income
There are two basic constraints on a claim for a tax credit on a
U.S. tax return for tax amounts paid to foreign governments.'63 First,
the FTC is limited to the amount of tax that would be owed if such
foreign amounts were subject to U.S. tax rates. The purpose of this is
to eliminate the possibility of the United States subsidizing countries
that have higher tax rates.'" It is true that a U.S. taxpayer is allowed
to cross-credit foreign taxes paid by deducting tax amounts paid to
high tax countries against taxes paid to low tax countries, thereby
reducing the U.S. tax due of foreign income.16 ' However, a second
limitation is that the ability to cross-credit is allowed only among
foreign taxes that occur within similar types (or "baskets") of
income.'" The categories have been amended over the years but
there are currently two baskets within which foreign income is placed:
general income ("active" income) and "passive" income. Cross-
crediting operates as a subsidy for foreign investment. By allowing a
U.S. taxpayer to credit foreign taxes higher than the U.S. rate on
some types of foreign-source income against the U.S. residual tax on
other types of low- or zero-taxed foreign-source income, the United
States is essentially giving the U.S. taxpayer a grant in the amount of
the U.S. residual tax eliminated." 167
It is important to understand the reasons for allowing FTCs and
cross-crediting as related to taxes paid to foreign governments.
Accounting for foreign taxes was initially available as a deduction in
the 1913 tax code but an unlimited foreign tax credit was added in
162. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Curtailing Deferral, supra note 5, at 455; Gravelle,
supra note 159, at 323; J. Clifton Fleming, Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA.
TAX REV. 299 (2001); INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5; JANE G.
GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX
RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2012); TAX HAVENS, supra note 5;
OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5.
163. See I.R.C. §§ 901-903 (2013); Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption,
supra note 5, at 132 ("The foreign tax credit is in the form of a dollar-for-dollar offset of
qualifying foreign taxes [so-called creditable taxes] against the taxpayer's pre-credit U.S.
tax liability.").
164. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 5.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5, at 132-33.
167. Id. at 134.
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1918.'6 The goal was and still is to prevent double taxation of income
earned in foreign countries while ensuring that such foreign income
does not completely escape taxation." Pursuit of these latter goals
was based on the principles of fairness and equity as well as
competitiveness.170 Before FTCs, taxpayers earning income abroad
were not being treated as equals with those earning income in the
United States. Allowing income to be taxed twice would effectively
burden U.S. producers competing in foreign countries where
taxpayers would not be subject to such double taxation.17' The United
States has inserted the elimination of the double taxation
requirement into many of the bilateral income tax treaties that it has
entered into with other countries that have also agreed to relieve
double taxation.172  Although proposals to reduce subsidization
available through cross-crediting FTCs by reducing the credit to a
deduction as well as other means have been suggested, amending the
FTC provisions in the law has been a challenge. 7 1
The issue acquires another layer of complexity because MNCs are
able to manipulate the tax system to reduce their U.S. tax liability by
virtue of the so-called mismatching of foreign expenses with U.S.
income. The Congressional Budget Office explains:
When determining (U.S. tax) liability before tax credits, firms
need not differentiate between domestic and foreign
expenses; all foreign expenses can be deducted entirely
against U.S. taxable income to reduce total U.S. tax liability.
Thus, expenses from foreign operations reduce U.S. tax
liability, even before the application of the foreign tax credit.
Moreover, the parent firm can take deductions for expenses it
incurs for its foreign operations in the year that those
168. Gravelle, supra note 159 at 327 n.16 (also providing a brief history of the tax laws
regarding foreign taxes).
169. Graetz, supra note 5, at 331.
170. Id. at 296-97.
171. Id.
172. Morse, supra note 157, at 549, 564; see INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 5, at 4-5 (stating the United States has entered approximately sixty-seven
bilateral income tax treaties).
173. See Daniel Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
65 (2011) (exploring a deduction for foreign taxes paid in addition to a reduced tax rate for
foreign source income); OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 19 (recommending a
disallowance of cross crediting by limiting the amount of foreign tax credits allowed from
each country); INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 10-11
(recommending four paths to further limiting cross-crediting of FTCs).
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expenses are incurred-even if the related foreign income is
not repatriated until a later year.174
It is difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion that MNCs are well
subsidized by U.S. tax laws when they move operations and business
outside the United States where they can utilize deferral, FICs, cross-
crediting FTCs and mismatching foreign expenses with U.S. income.
However, the foregoing examples are only a few of the methods
available to MNCs operating abroad. When viewed cumulatively, it
has been shown that with skillful tax planning, MNCs can not only
reduce their U.S. tax on foreign income to zero for certain income,
but can effectively be subsidized by U.S. tax laws when operating in
foreign territories."'
D. Runaway Production Companies' Exploitation of the U.S. International
Tax Laws
The degree to which entertainment companies engaging in
runaway production are able to exploit the U.S. international tax laws
is an issue that needs to be addressed. The precise answer would
have to be obtained directly from these companies, and unfortunately
that information is not publicly available. The best that a researcher
can do to answer the question is to examine information that is
publicly available. It has been reported that the following
entertainment MNCs have subsidiaries in countries that provide
motion picture and television incentives: Viacom, Inc., Comcast
Corp., News Corp., Time Warner, Inc., The Walt Disney Co., and
Sony Corp."' Looking at the issue from a wider perspective, the
Government Accountability Office issued a report indicating that
174. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 9-10.
175. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5.
176. Annual Report (Form 10-K), List of Subsidiaries as of 9/30/2012, VIACOM, INC.,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1339947/000119312512471870/d435374dex211.htm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014); Annual Report (Form 10-K), List of Subsidiaries as of
2/21/2013, COMCAST CORP., http://www.cmcsa.com/secfiling.cfm?=1193125-13-67693 (last
visited Mar. 16, 2014); Annual Report (Form 10-K), List of Subsidiaries as of 8/14/2012,
NEWS CORP., http://investor.21cf.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=1193125-12-355856&CIK=13
08161 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); Annual Report (Form 10-K), List of Subsidiaries as of
12/31/2012, TIME WARNER, INC., http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1377013/00011
9312513062081/d483194d10k.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); Annual Report (Form 10-K),
List Of Subsidiaries as of 9/29/2012, THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, http://thewaltdisney
company.com/sites/default/ files/reports/q4-fyl2-form-10k.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2014);
Corporate Information, Affiliated Companies (Consolidated Subsidiaries), SONY CORP.,
http://www.sony.net/Sonylnfo/CorporatelnfolSubsidiaries/outside.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2014).
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eighty-three of the hundred largest publicly traded U.S. corporations
(in terms of 2007 revenue) reported having subsidiaries in
jurisdictions listed as tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions."
Among these eighty-three corporations are Comcast Corp., News
Corp., Time Warner, Inc., and The Walt Disney Co.'78 Furthermore,
articles written by leading tax legal counsel to entertainment
companies recommend that companies engaged in film and television
production and distribution should take advantage of the U.S.
international tax laws in order to pay less tax to the United States.'
Thus, one can reasonably conclude that MNCs engaged in runaway
production know the tax opportunities available for doing business
abroad, and it is also reasonable to conclude that they take advantage
of them."O Through the U.S. tax laws, the U.S. government subsidizes
taxpayers who do business in foreign countries by foregoing U.S. tax
receipts based on reasons such as equity, competitiveness of U.S.
companies, and income tax timing issues (that is, the inability to pay
U.S. tax when earned abroad). However, the underlying basis of the
U.S. government providing such positive carrots is perverted when
U.S. MNCs are lured to a foreign country to spend money on
production on the basis of MPIs provided by the foreign government
as well.
177. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-157, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION: LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS & FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH
SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY
JURISDICTIONS (2008).
178. Id. Viacom, Inc. and Sony Corp. have also reported that they have subsidiaries in
tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions. See Annual Report, VIACOM, INC., supra
note 170 (Netherlands, Switzerland, Bahamas, Cayman Islands); see also Corporate
Information, Affiliated Companies (Consolidated Subsidiaries), SONY CORP., supra note
176 (Switzerland, Singapore).
179. Sed Crest, Media Companies Reveal Tax Priorities, 15 INT'L TAX REV. 13 (2004);
Schuyler Moore, 5 Ways Hollywood Can Cut Its Taxes, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER GUEST
BLOG (May 10, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.comlnews/tax-loopholes-5-ways-
hollywood-500180 (recommending foreign subsidiaries and deferral).
180. See Jason Garcia, Disney Triples Offshore Profits, Saving On U.S. Taxes,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 9, 2013) available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-
12-09/business/os-disney-iffshore-profits-taxes-20131206_1_walt-disney-world-u-s-senate-
profits (reporting that in 2013 the Walt Disney Company tripled the amount of foreign
profits it is keeping in offshore subsidiaries to a total amount of $1.5 billion).
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VI.U.S. International Tax Policy, Runaway Production, and
Proposed Tax Law Amendment
A. The Need For Reform
The conclusion drawn in Part V has been affirmed by many
scholars, commentators, and legislators who have also concluded that
the U.S. tax laws are too generous to U.S.-based MNCs operating
abroad, and that U.S. tax laws should be amended to correct the
situation.18 ' However, a few other questions need to be addressed
before reform can be suggested. First, how has the U.S. government's
decision to extensively subsidize U.S.-based MNCs' foreign economic
activity affected U.S. tax revenue? Second, how does runaway
production fit within the current positive carrots provided by the U.S.
government through U.S. international tax laws? And third, does
U.S. tax policy require amendments to the U.S. international tax laws
to address runaway production?
The first answer is that the U.S. tax base is extensively reduced by
the current subsidization of economic activity outside the United
States by its international tax laws.182 In addition to the estimated
effective tax rate of 2.3% that MNCs paid on active foreign earnings
in 2004,8 reports estimate that in 2008, approximately 12% of all
federal revenue came from corporate income taxes, approximately
half of which was paid by MNCs reporting income from other
countries." Also, 7% of all federal revenue came from corporate
income taxes in 2009 and 10% in 2012.181 In addition, reports show
that if the United States ended deferral, it would collect
approximately $114 billion in taxes between 2012 and 2022.'8 If the
United States reduced cross-crediting of FTCs by determining them
181. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
182. See Barker, supra note 5, at 651, 652:
A critical reason behind the international trend toward the alternative of
a foreign business income (territorial) exemption system is that territorial
exemption is perceived to be a more effective way of identifying and
preserving the domestic tax base. Economic projections, to the effect
that an exemption system is expected to substantially raise revenue as
compared to present law, seem to confirm this.
Id.
183. See note 143 and accompanying text.
184. OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 1.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 18.
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based on the share of aggregate earnings repatriated from each
country then the United States would collect approximately $57
billion more in taxes during the same years.' The answer to the
second question-how this affects runaway production-is that the
U.S.-based MNCs that are lured to foreign locations are being further
subsidized beyond the extensive subsidization (positive carrots) that
the U.S. government provides via U.S. international tax laws.'" The
answer to the third question-namely, are reforms to the U.S. tax
code required to ameliorate the imbalance-is that U.S. international
tax policy analysis results in the conclusion that foreign MPIs that
U.S.-based MNCs receive (positive carrots) when moving their
operations and expenditures to foreign countries to produce their film
and television projects require the U.S. government to address the
impact they have on the positive carrots additionally provided to
them by U.S. international tax laws.
B. Proposed Reform
My proposal is that U.S. tax law should require a dollar-for-dollar
elimination of the tax incentives that U.S.-based MNCs receive from
foreign countries when moving capital, investments, and operations
outside the United States in the form of runaway production. The
dollar-for-dollar reduction originates from the current benefits U.S.-
based MNCs receive from the U.S. international tax laws when
moving offshore as described in Part V.'89 The reduction is also based
on the tax policy conclusions reached here." This proposal is
essentially a dollar-for-dollar withdrawal of the positive carrots the
U.S. government currently provides U.S.-based MNCs through the
U.S. tax code based on equity, competitiveness, and other
arguments.'91  In the simplest terms, when moving capital,
187. Id. at 19. See supra Part V.A., B., and C.
188. See supra Part V.
189. Supra Part V.
190. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L.
REV. 1, 24 (2006) stating:
This, then, is the third goal of taxation: regulation of private sector
activity by rewarding activities that are considered desirable (via
deductions or credits) and deterring activities that are considered
undesirable (via increased taxation). A major portion of the current
Code can only be understood as fulfilling this regulatory function.
Id.
191. See supra Part V.
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investments, and operations abroad, U.S.-based MNCs can utilize the
generous positive carrots currently provided by the U.S. government
through U.S. international tax laws. But if they additionally take
MPIs provided by foreign governments, then they should not receive
the full amounts of the positive carrots currently provided through
the U.S. tax code to the degree necessary to achieve the goals stated
in this article.
C. U.S. International Tax Policy
The analysis supporting the above conclusion can begin with
identifying the reasons why the U.S. government taxes its citizens.
Several reasons have been identified by scholars, including two
primary reasons that are important regarding runaway production.m
The reasons include the ability of a government to raise revenue and
a government's desire to influence its taxpayers' behaviors. 93 Tax
policy is further complicated when addressing international tax laws
because several other factors also affect a government's ability to tax
and influence the behavior of its citizens. Some factors include: (1)
world monetary policies and resulting exchange rates, (2) the tax
systems of other countries, (3) the tax treaties the United States has
entered with many countries, (4) the tax rates other countries offer,
especially if these rates are lower than the tax rates of the United
States and, (5) international trade concerns and laws.194 International
tax policy is generally an attempt by a country to balance the level of
tax paid to the taxpayer's home country vis-h-vis the tax revenue that
the home country allows to be paid to foreign countries (at the
expense of home country revenue), while imposing these taxes with
192. Avi-Yonah, supra note 190, at 3 (raise revenue, redistributive function, and a
regulatory component; for example, tax expenditures); Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with
Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413,415-16 (2004)
(raise revenue, ensure stable economic growth, and serve as a vehicle for social and economic
policy); Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1323,1327-28 (2008).
193. Avi-Yonah, supra note 190, at 3, 22 (revenue-raising function of taxes, the
redistributive function of taxes and the regulatory power of taxes). Starting in 1918, "the
United States began a long series of [tax] measures designed to reward some forms of
corporate activity and deter others." Id. See also Galle supra note 192, at 1346 (noting
"that a tax system can serve several different functions."); Martinez, supra note 192, at
415-16 (noting the revenue raising function in addition to supporting stable economic
growth and "as a vehicle of social and economic policy"); see supra Part III. regarding the
government's ability to influence citizens' choices.
194. William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition:
Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 161, 165 (2002) [hereinafter
Barker, Optimal International Taxation]; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, FACTORS, supra
note 161; Graetz, supra note 5, at 307-08.
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efficiency and fairness. Scholars have developed the framework of
efficiency, equity (fairness), and administrability in order to evaluate
competing tax policy goals. This classic framework will be utilized to
reform current international tax laws for runaway productions. 95
1. Efficiency
Economists most often measure efficiency by evaluating how
resources are allocated and used,'9 whereas tax policy analysis
measures efficiency by evaluating the extent to which taxes influence
the economic decisions of those affected by such laws.'" One of the
criteria used to measure such economic decisions is whether or not
any deadweight loss has occurred by virtue of decisions made under
the influence of the tax laws.1 98 Put simply, deadweight losses are
incurred when resources are used in less economically productive
ways in response to the money that can be obtained from tax
avoidance.'" Inefficient taxes create deadweight losses while efficient
taxes do not; obviously, the greater the response a taxpayer has to an
inefficient tax, then the greater the deadweight loss.2' As generally
applied to runaway production, the extent to which taxpayers would
not move capital and operations to foreign countries if they did not
195. Avi-Yonah, supra note 190, at 26; Morse, supra note 157, at 552, 566; Xuan-Thao
Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76
BROOK. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (focusing on equity and efficiency in the taxation of intellectual
property). But see Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths, 40
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 298 (2008) stating:
In this article, I demonstrate that tax policy is a largely mythical concept,
more akin to the Holy Grail than to anything else. Tax policy more nearly
describes an ideal than it describes a normative principle. I conclude that self-
interest, irrationality, and ineptitude explain the vicissitudes of tax policy in
the modem world.
Id.
196. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 61
(1996) (describing basic economic theorems for allocation of resources); see also Herbert
I. Lazerow, Criteria of International Tax Policy, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1123, 1123-24
(2004) (applying seven criteria to evaluate international tax laws); Graetz, supra note 5, at
284 n.35 (citing exceptions).
197. Morse, supra note 157, at 567; Lazerow, supra note 196, at 1132; Zolt, supra note
196, at 61; but see Nguyen & Maine, supra note 195, at 5-6 (noting economic growth as an
alternative measurement of tax efficiency, that is, a finding of an efficient tax system
where it promotes economic growth and an inefficient tax system if it does not).
198. Morse, supra note 157, at 567; Shapiro, supra note 5, at 149 n.33; David Elkins,
Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 43,47 (2006).
199. Id.
200. Elkins, supra note 198, at 47; Zolt, supra note 196, at 63.
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receive tax incentives is the extent of deadweight loss that can be
associated with their decision to do just that, thereby making such tax
policies (that is, the provision of tax incentives) inefficient.
The analysis of efficiency within international tax law is more
complicated than the aforementioned general principles,20 1 and
certain theories have been developed to assist the analysis. These
theories are based in neutralities that seek to isolate tax policies to
evaluate each policy's effect on efficiency.202 Since all taxes, to some
extent, are inefficient, it raises the questions of when they are
inefficient and to what degree are they inefficient. Although
empirical research regarding the latter questions has not produced
universal bright line answers when applied to taxpayers' decisions for
investing capital in domestic or foreign locations, there are broad
conclusions that can be made from the research that has been done.
Three basic conclusions are discernible: first, a primary goal of U.S.
international tax policy has been to maximize wealth or utility;203
second, it is clear that taxes definitely do influence taxpayers'
decisions regarding the location of capital investments; 20 and third,
"targeted tax incentives are not neutral and are inefficient." 205
The five theories of efficiency that have been developed based on
neutralities provide broad structures that can be applied to a tax
system or to a specific tax law to evaluate its efficiency, and they are
the benchmarks that have assisted scholars in reaching the above
three conclusions. These benchmarks are: (a) capital export
neutrality ("CEN"), (b) capital import neutrality ("CIN"), (c)
national neutrality ("NN"), (d) national ownership neutrality
("NON"), and (e) capital ownership neutrality ("CON").206 Since the
1960s, these theories, or benchmarks, have been the primary
201. See Barker, supra note 5, at 655.
202. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 161.
203. Graetz, supra note 5, at 270 n.30 (citing historical examples by the U.S. government).
204. Taxation New Evidence, supra note 5, at 22; Hines, Tax Policy, supra note 5.
205. Barker, supra note 5, at 655.
206. See Gravelle, supra note 159, at 327 n.15. The first three of these concepts are
generally attributed to Peggy Richman Musgrave. See generally PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME (1969); PEGGY B.
RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1963). CON and NON are associated with Mihir Desai and Jim Hines. Mihir A. Desai &
James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (2003).
The term CON, however, appears to have been coined by Michael Devereux.
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evaluations by which efficiency has been evaluated in international
tax law policy.20
(a) CEN. CEN is achieved when an investor makes a decision to
invest in a foreign jurisdiction or the investor's home country without
regard to taxation. The investment is taxed the same whether the
investment is made at home or abroad.2 0 A primary goal in achieving
CEN from tax laws is to design them so that they maximize global
efficiency. 209 Tax incentives that are given around the world for
motion picture and television production violate CEN and are
inefficient because they induce investors to make investment location
decisions based on the preferable tax treatment that will be obtained
in the jurisdiction, thereby creating deadweight loss and reducing
global efficiency.210 U.S. tax law amendments counterbalancing the
inefficient motion picture and television production incentives would
move the U.S. tax laws closer to CEN, and therefore, would make the
U.S. tax laws more efficient.
(b) CIN. CIN is concerned with the equal tax treatment of capital
invested in a jurisdiction whether that capital is invested by domestic
sources or is brought into the jurisdiction by foreign sources.21 1 CIN is
concerned with the efficient worldwide allocation of savings versus
consumption and can affect the ability of businesses to compete in
foreign jurisdictions.2 12 It has been well settled that absent identical
tax rates for every worldwide jurisdiction, it is not possible to design
tax laws that achieve CEN and CIN at the same time,213 but tax laws
must be designed to achieve one or the other, or to create a
compromise between their policy goals.214  The film and television
production incentives available worldwide generally are available to
207. Michael S. Knoll, The Connection Between Competitiveness and International
Taxation, 65 TAx L. REV. 349, 368 (2012); but see Shapiro, supra note 5, at 163 (noting
critiques of these benchmarks).
208. Graetz, supra note 5, at 270.
209. Id.
210, Knoll, supra note 207, at 368; see Graetz, supra note 5, at 325 ("From the
perspective of CEN, which abhors tax-induced distortions in the location of investments,
any tax-induced shift in the allocation of resources is bad, whether the culprit is U.S. or
foreign taxes.")
211. Graetz, supra note 5, at 270.
212. Graetz, supra note 5, at 270-71; see Gravelle, supra note 159, at 328, Table 1
(noting that "competitiveness" is an objective in a territorial tax system and CIN is
associated with it).
213. Gravelle, supra note 159, at 329-30.
214. Graetz, supra note 5, at 272, 274 (stating that CEN has been chosen more often
than not because of its elasticity).
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both foreign capital and domestic capital invested in each country so
there is equal treatment of both.
(c) NN. From a practical perspective, perhaps the most important
neutrality that is violated by motion picture and television tax
incentives is national neutrality ("NN"). This benchmark has been
defined as seeking "neutrality between the pretax return on domestic
investments and the return on foreign investments after the payment
of foreign taxes.""' Taxpayers that invest in film and television
projects in the United States do not receive the tax incentive money
that investments in similar projects abroad receive, which increases
the return on investment for investments in such foreign jurisdiction.
Since the payment of foreign taxes is either deferred, subject to FTCs,
cross-crediting of FTCs, and other exploitations of the U.S.
international tax laws by MNCs, NN is violated by the U.S.
international tax laws in general.216 The increased return on
investment from foreign motion picture and television funds only
serves to move U.S. international tax laws even further from reaching
the benchmark of NN.217 The practical implications of the increased
violation of NN by incentives from foreign jurisdictions given to U.S.-
based MNCs to runaway results in the further loss of U.S. tax revenue
collection at a time when "the United States is in a revenue crisis."2 18
That is, the tax revenue that would have been paid to the U.S.
treasury from an investment is instead lured to a foreign jurisdiction
and contributed to the treasury of the foreign nation providing the
motion picture incentives. As stated above,219 the current conclusions
by scholars, commentators, and legislators are that the U.S. tax laws
are generally too generous to MNCs operating abroad and should be
amended to obtain more tax revenue for the United States.220 Film
and television incentives that decrease U.S. tax revenue by luring
215. Graetz, supra note 5, at 274.
216. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1607-08; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than
Exemption, supra note 5, at 98; Shaviro, supra note 173, at 70-73.
217. Id.
218. Clifton, Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note
5, at 400, 459 (discussing the possible structures of a territorial or exempt international tax
system, noting that "because of the U.S. fiscal situation, it is particularly important that a
U.S. territorial system not forgo more revenue than is necessary to achieve the system's
appropriate ends").
219. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
220. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1587; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than
Exemption, supra note 5, at 85, 149; INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at
4-6; PRESIDENT'S TAX REFORM, supra note 5, at 2, 9-10; Shaviro, supra note 173;
OPrIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 1, 11.
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U.S.-based capital investments abroad violate NN. The proposed
amendment to counterbalance these foreign incentives would move
U.S. tax laws closer to NN, which is a stated goal of what generally
needs to be accomplished with amendments to the U.S. tax laws.221
(d) NON. Tax laws that meet the NON standard generally do so
under a similar definition to NN. 2  Therefore, the conclusions
regarding foreign motion picture and television incentives'
inefficiency under NN are unchanged under the analysis of NON.
(e) CON. "A tax system that satisfies CON is one in which
companies, regardless of where they are based, compete on an equal
footing in seeking to acquire productive assets. Tax considerations
will not advantage or disadvantage any of them in their ability to
acquire productive assets."22 This neutrality is violated if ownership
of an asset is determined because of tax considerations, since it would
be moving the ownership of an asset away from its most efficient
owner.22 Receiving foreign film and television incentives generally
requires the recipients to own the copyright of the underlying project,
or to have a written contract to provide production services to the
copyright owner.2 5 In general, the lack of a requirement of copyright
transfer to the country providing the incentive in order to obtain such
country's MPI does not support a finding that these incentives violate
the CON neutrality. However, it is unknown if U.S.-based MNCs are
in fact transferring the copyright ownership to the foreign subsidiaries
that are receiving the tax incentives which, if proven, would violate
CON and indicate a required counterbalancing amendment to U.S.
tax laws.
Legislators with an understanding of efficiency metrics and the
concerns outlined herein have enacted U.S. international tax laws."'
221. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1588; see also Clifton, Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Designing a U.S. Exemption System, supra note 5, at 458-59; see also INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 8-9; APPROACHES TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 5, at 43-46; PRESIDENT'S TAX REFORM, supra note 5; Shapiro, supra note 5, at
170; See OPTIONS FOR TAXING, supra note 5, at 1, 17.
222. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 164, 166.
223. Knoll, supra note 207, at 368; see Gravelle, supra note 159, at 327 n.15 (reviewing
the history of the development of the terms CON and NON).
224. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 164, 165.
225. See e.g., CAN. AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, PSTC PROGRAM
GUIDELINES 10 (2012).
226. Graetz, supra note 5, at 274 states:
It is, for example, now commonplace, whenever international tax issues
come before the taxwriting committees of Congress, for the pamphlets of
the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to describe a choice or
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U.S. international tax policy reflects the favoring of certain
neutralities at the expense of others, leading recent evaluations by the
U.S. government and scholars to conclude that the neutralities of
CEN, CON, and CIN have been emphasized at the expense of NN
and NON, thereby necessitating reforms that would generally
increase the U.S. tax base with respect to U.S.-based MNCs. 227 On
balance, the efficiency metrics favor the elimination of foreign motion
picture and television tax incentives because they divert the flow of
capital offshore which alters the current balance of neutralities,
makes the U.S. international tax laws even less efficient, and further
decreases the U.S tax base and revenue.
2. Equity/Fairness
Professor Michael J. Graetz succinctly stated:
To be sure, thinking about fairness in international taxation
complicates both analysis and policymaking. It is frequently
controversial even in the domestic context to achieve
agreement about the appropriate level or redistributive goals
of the income tax, or to assess under what circumstances
equity demands equal treatment. When the relevant
comparisons are between citizens, residents, and foreigners,
the difficulties multiply. Multinational corporations add
further complications and controversy. Questions of the
appropriate measurement of the tax base and level of tax also
become more complex when income is earned
transnationally.22
In spite of the challenges identified by Professor Graetz, tax
policy requires an assessment of fairness when evaluating
international tax laws.229 The first challenge is one of inter-nation
equity. A nation has a right to tax its citizens on their worldwide
income and each nation has a right to tax activity by foreigners within
its nation.' As a result, the conundrum of double taxation arises
compromise between CEN and CIN as the normative framework
through which international tax policy issues should be addressed.
Id.
227. Id.; David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 57,121-22 (2012).
228. Graetz, supra note 5, at 306.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 298; Clifton, Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a US. Exemption System,
supra note 5, at 401; Barker, Optimal International Taxation, supra note 194, at 185-86.
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which is customarily the responsibility of the nation demanding
double taxation to eliminate. 231' The United States fulfills this
responsibility by providing its citizens FTCs, restricting any FTC to
the amount of tax paid to the foreign country. 2 A country asserts its
right to tax activity within its borders based on a "benefits received"
theory.23 So a party generating income within that country's borders
utilizes that country's infrastructure, legal system, system of
enforcement of laws, and other resources, and is required to provide
taxes to support such use.23 However, when a party has been lured
within those borders with tax incentives, the equity of the benefits
received theory is undermined, that is, the party would not have used
the resources of the foreign country if not for the requirement that
they be physically present in that foreign country in order to receive
tax incentives.
The U.S. government grants FTCs based on equity,235 and the tax
incentives that lure U.S. MNCs to foreign countries do not conform
to the underlying equitable reasons for which FTCs are granted.
Therefore, inter-nation equity considerations support the reduction of
the positive carrots provided to U.S.-based MNCs by the U.S.
government through the U.S. tax code when those MNCs take foreign
tax incentives.
How to assess the question of fairness or equity when
approaching tax reform is always perplexing. Historically scholars,
commentators and legislators have examined equity in tax policy
analysis based on "horizontal equity" ("HE") and "vertical equity"
("VE").236 The HE standard provides that those in equal positions
should be treated equally, while the VE standard provides that those
who are treated differently should be treated differently based on
appropriate distinctions."' HE and VE have been subjected to
intense academic scrutiny resulting in the prevalent conclusion that
HE is not useful as an independent measurement of equity or fairness
231. See Clifton, Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing a US. Exemption System, supra note 5,
at 402.
232. I.R.C. §§ 901, 903, 904 (2013).
233. Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5, at 80-81.
234. Barker, Optimal International Taxation, supra note 194, at 199, 209.
235. Graetz, supra note 5, at 296.
236. Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV.
919, 925 (1997); James Repetti & Diane Ring, Horizontal Equity Revisited, 13 FLA. TAx REV.
135 (2012).
237. Staudt, supra note 236, at 925; see also Elkins, supra note 198, at 43 n.1 (providing
a timeline of the evolution of the horizontal equity principle).
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in tax policy. Accordingly, some argue that HE should therefore be
abandoned or absorbed into VE, leading to the further prevalent
conclusion that VE is not more useful as an independent
measurement because it must employ a substantive theory of equity
or fairness to obtain an evaluation of these concepts in tax policy.238
A few of the more prevalent substantive theories scholars have
applied when examining VE include: utilitarianism, the benefit
theory, ability to pay, and the Rawlsian theory. This article will apply
the first three substantive theories to the tax policy recommendation
for a reduction of the positive carrots provided to U.S.-based MNCs
by the U.S. government through the U.S. tax code when those MNCs
take foreign MPIs. However, certain assumptions and omissions
must first be addressed."
First, omitting a discussion of the issues underlying HE and VE,
this article will accept that HE is not a standard that can be
independently applied to tax policy but VE, utilizing a substantive
theory of justice, is an appropriate standard. Second, as pointed out
by Professor Graetz, HE and VE can best assist the assessment of
equity or fairness when applied to individuals,"o and the proposed
equity analysis in this article is applied to MNCs and not individuals.
For purposes of this article it is assumed that application of the
underlying substantive theories of justice will shed light on the
equity/fairness issue as applied to corporations and MNCs, and will
omit an analysis of the assumption. A third issue is that there has
been a division among scholars as to whether it is proper to have a
238. Repetti & Ring, supra note 236, at 135 (providing a history and analysis of the
recent debates and conclusions on both sides of the debate); Staudt, supra note 236, at 926,
933; Zolt, supra note 196, at 89; but see Elkins, supra note 198, at 88 (concluding that HE
and VE are incompatible and tax theorists "must clarify within which framework they are
operating and the underlying goal of their theories").
239. Staudt, supra note 236, at 950-51 (John Rawls "focuses on the rights of
individuals under the social contract.... According to Rawls's theory, any policy that
impinges upon an individual's right to equal liberty is problematic."); Elkins, supra note
198, at 54-55 states:
John Rawls considered equality to be an end in itself, and used it as his
starting point in the development of his "difference principle." The
difference principle holds that any deviation from absolute equality in
the distribution of primary social goods is justified only if the least well-
off in the unequal distribution are better off than they would have been
under a more equal distribution.
Id. Since this article is focusing on MNCs, Rawlsian theories will not be applied
within the efficiency evaluation. Id.
240. Graetz, supra note 5, at 301-02.
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corporate tax at all since taxes are ultimately borne by individuals,
whether in their capacity of shareholder, consumer, labor or
otherwise.241 For purposes of this article, it is assumed that a
corporate tax is assessed, and further that it is properly assessed on
the worldwide income of corporations.
(a) Utilitarianism Theory. The first of the three selected
substantive theories mentioned above, utilitarianism, measures
changes in policies based on whether they increase or decrease
maximum welfare of a society.242 "Modern utilitarians evaluating tax
laws are primarily concerned with the market incentives and
disincentives found in the I.R.C."243 In particular, the inquiry is
whether the tax incentives and disincentives are efficient or
inefficient; that is, the more inefficient they are, the more market
growth and overall wealth should decrease, and the less utility such
tax laws provide. To the extent that runaway production occurs
because the taxpayers are pursuing tax incentives in foreign countries,
then these policies are reducing U.S. society's overall utility by
diverting capital to less productive activities by driving real wages for
U.S. workers lower over time and by forcing the participants to incur
costs in pursuit of these tax incentives. This diverts further resources
from productive activities in the global economy.2 The fact that the
foreign film and television incentives reduce overall utility supports
the conclusion that the U.S. tax system would be more equitable if
these MNCs do not receive positive carrots from the U.S. government
via U.S. international tax laws in addition to the positive carrots they
receive from foreign governments for runaway production under the
principle of utilitarianism.245
(b) Benefit Theory. Put simply, the "benefit theory" holds that
the tax level should be commensurate with the benefits received by
241. Id. at 302 states:
Most economists now regard an income tax on corporations as a tax on
capital income, borne by suppliers of capital, but the burden of actual
corporate income taxes, at least in part, may be borne by consumers
and/or workers. It is standard practice in government analyses either to
assume the U.S. corporate income tax is split 50-50 by owners of capital
and consumers or to treat the incidence of the tax as uncertain.
Id.
242. Elkins, supra note 198, at 52; Staudt, supra note 236, at 939-40.
243. Staudt, supra note 236, at 943.
244. See supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
FACTORS, supra note 161, at 11, 12.
245. See supra Part VI.C.1. for a discussion of efficiency.
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each party.2 The difficulty with this theory lies in how to measure
and allocate the benefits received. A benefit evaluation becomes
less difficult if the focus is on one group of taxpayers, such as U.S.-
based MNCs that receive foreign film and television tax money.2 4
Such MNCs not only utilize the basic benefits provided by the U.S.
government, which includes the U.S. infrastructure, legal system,
system of enforcement of laws, and other resources, but they also
have been insistent that the U.S. government take special actions on
its behalf regarding its business endeavors. For example, the MPAA,
comprised of the six major U.S. studios and subsidiaries of the MNCs
that represent the most significant amount of runaway production,249
consistently and successfully lobbies the U.S. government to act in its
interests spending sums of money wholly disproportionate to its
size.m Among other things, the MPAA lobbies issues regarding
foreign trade relations and "multilateral trade agreements such as
GATS, TRIPS, and the Convention on Cultural Diversity.""
Further, the MPAA utilizes the USTR to file claims against foreign
countries on its behalf for alleged international trade violations.252 In
recent years, the MPAA has also enlisted the U.S. government's
resources to combat international piracy of its product. The MPAA
has stated:
The six major studios of the MPAA generate billions of
dollars annually from filmed entertainment distributed around
the globe .... The online theft of creative content is one of
the most significant and ubiquitous barriers to the global free
flow of information that US industry confronts around the
world. To effectively foster legitimate online commerce, the
US government must grapple with the massive quantity of
stolen content available online and the perception among
246. Staudt, supra note 236, at 936-37.
247. Id. at 937.
248. See supra Part II.C. regarding the parties that are engaging in runaway
production.
249. Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, http://www.mpaa.org/faq (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
250. Lee, supra note 10, at 396.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 380-81; Stephen K. Shiu, Motion Picture Piracy: Controlling the Seemingly
Endless Supply of Counterfeit Optical Discs in Taiwan, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 607,
639-40 (2006) (discussing intellectual property piracy he states "without the USTR, the
MPAA, having little leverage alone, probably would not be able to influence any change
in Taiwan").
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some consumers that the theft of property online is of little
consequence. MPAA strongly supports efforts by the US
government to work with trading partners to foster legitimate
online commerce, which includes the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights online.
Although the MPAA members generate billions of dollars
annually around the globe, as has been shown in Part V, very little of
that revenue is taxed within the United States.254 Yet, these MNCs
demand that the U.S. government grapple with the worldwide theft of
their product on their behalf by allocating government resources to
address these issues. 255  Notwithstanding the measurement and
allocation issues regarding these benefits received by these MNCs, it
is reasonable to find that the equitable benefit received by them from
the U.S. government to address the numerous and costly concerns
specific to their business supports a conclusion that they should not
receive positive carrots from the U.S. government via U.S.
international tax laws in addition to the positive carrots they receive
from foreign governments for runaway production. Alternatively, if
these MNCs insist on receiving the positive carrots from both the U.S.
and foreign governments, then it would seem to be more equitable
that they segregate the product that is recipient of such foreign tax
money and ask those governments to "grapple with the massive
quantity of stolen content available online" on their behalf as well as
address any worldwide market access and other trade issues they
encounter with this product.
(c) Ability to Pay Theory. The "ability to pay" theory holds that:
Tax systems are fair if the taxes demanded of each taxpayer
reflect their actual ability to pay .... Tax systems that allow
taxpayers to hide certain types of income via loopholes,
income classification, tax shelters, or other schemes, do not
accurately impose the tax burden based on tax payers ability
to pay, and are thus less fair."256
253. MPAA Comments Regarding Global Free Flow of Information on the Internet, 75
F.R. 60068, Docket No. 100921457-0457-041 at 12 (Dec 2010), available at http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/files/ntialcomments/100921457-0457-01/attachments/intemational%20filingMPAA.pdf.
254. See supra Part V.
255. Shiu, supra note 252, at 607.
256. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 160.
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As shown in Part V.B. and Part VI.A., the MNCs engaging in
runaway production have a clear ability to pay but the amount of
taxes they are paying to the United States are inadequate in
comparison to their ability to pay.257 It is very clear that the U.S.
international tax laws allow these MNCs to be generously subsidized
thereby enabling them to pay even less tax by engaging in runaway
production. This analysis supports the conclusion that under the
principle of ability to pay, the U.S. tax system would be more
"equitable" if these MNCs do not receive positive carrots from the
U.S. government via U.S. international tax laws in addition to the
positive carrots they receive from foreign governments for runaway
production.
3. Administrability
The classic measure of an "administrable" tax is one that
minimizes both the costs of the government to administer the law and
the costs of the taxpayer to comply.258 When taxpayers move capital
and operations outside the United States, the process necessary for
the United States to collect a tax via the U.S. international tax laws
involves complex tax laws requiring both the United States and the
taxpayer to expend considerable resources to administer and comply
with these laws.' 9 Applying administrability to taxation of MNCs that
move capital and operations abroad (i.e., runaway film and television
production) begins with comparing the administrability of the U.S.
tax laws when MNCs spend capital and engage in operations within
the United States as opposed to when they spend capital and engage
in operations abroad. This is because MNCs must move capital and
operations abroad to obtain the film and television tax incentives
from the foreign country, removing the revenues generated from U.S.
tax laws to foreign tax laws. An exploration of the comparable
administrability of U.S. domestic tax laws and U.S. international tax
laws is beyond the scope of this article, but neither set of laws is
currently praised for its simplicity. In this article efficiency and
equity/fairness are given the primary consideration, while
administrability is considered to be neutral in the overall examination
257. See supra notes 143 and 157 and accompanying text; see also Part V.D.
258. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BuFF. L. REV. 1191, 1202 (2008); Nguyen &
Maine, supra note 195, at 27.
259. Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Curtailing Deferral, supra note 5, at 492 (1999) (in the
context of controlled foreign companies and deferral); see also Graetz, supra note 5, at
331; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse than Exemption, supra note 5, at 125-27 (discussing
the difficulties of collecting tax under I.R.C. § 482, transfer pricing rules).
300 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 36:2
of how tax policy relates to motion picture and television tax
incentives received from foreign nations. However, the proposed tax
amendments presented below do raise administrability issues that will
require examination under the classic measure of an administrable
tax that may impact the efficiency and equity/fairness conclusions
reached above. But as stated above, those considerations are beyond
the scope of this article.
D. Implementation of the Proposed Tax Amendment
The above analysis of U.S. international tax policy analysis
warrants the conclusion that the U.S. tax laws should be revised in
regard to foreign MPIs. The outcome of any revision must be
designed to ameliorate the impact of these incentives when they are
exploited in conjunction with the extensive subsidies, positive carrots,
that MNCs are already provided by the U.S. tax code when moving
capital, investments and operations abroad. More specifically, the
goal of these revisions would be to achieve a dollar-for-dollar
elimination of the MPIs; in order to essentially withdraw an equal
amount of positive carrots that the U.S. government currently
provides through the U.S. tax code.
To accomplish this goal, the following five amendments are
proposed: Proposal 1, the worldwide gross amounts of foreign MPIs
received must be added to the final calculation of the taxpayer's tax
owed on its U.S. tax return; Proposal 2, any and all other tax credits
that a U.S. taxpayer otherwise receives in calculating its U.S. tax
owed must be disallowed up to the worldwide gross amounts of
foreign MPIs received; Proposal 3, deferral must be ended for any
project that receives any foreign MPIs; Proposal 4, deductions must
be disallowed for the U.S. taxpayer up to the worldwide gross
amounts of foreign MPIs received; or, Proposal 5, foreign tax credits
must be disallowed for the U.S. taxpayer up to the worldwide gross
amounts of foreign MPIs received. Each of the proposed revisions
has costs and benefits associated with implementation which are
discussed below. Proposals 1 and 2 will be evaluated together and
Proposals 3, 4, and 5 will be evaluated together.
1. Proposals l and 2
Proposals 1 and 2 focus on the U.S. tax return of the taxpayer
accepting the foreign MPIs. These proposals would be effective in
addressing the runaway production issue based on the fact that the
primary recipients of the foreign MPIs are U.S.-based MNCs that
have controlled foreign corporations, namely, subsidiaries in the
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foreign countries that are providing the MPIs. However, the
connection between the U.S.-based taxpayer and the acceptance of
the foreign MPIs by another party in the foreign country is a primary
issue. The trigger to either Proposals 1 or 2 could be the ownership of
the subsidiary that accepts the foreign MPIs or it could be the
ownership of the copyright of the project that receives the foreign
MPIs, or it could be the "ownership" of the project under an
ownership standard already developed in tax law.2m Taxpayers faced
with either Proposal 1 or 2 would most likely react to the new laws by
reviewing their ownership of the project in an attempt to circumvent
this trigger provision in Proposals 1 or 2. However, to MNCs,
ownership principles are currently important for economic reasons
such as building a library of intellectual property in addition to being
important for other tax determinations. For example, depreciation,
sale-leaseback transactions (in which the owner sells the ownership of
the project to a foreign party who then leases it back), the
determination of whether payments are compensation for services or
royalty payments, and whether a transfer of rights to the project are
inventory or the transfer of a capital asset. As such, the taxpayer's
attempt to avoid ownership to avoid Proposals 1 or 2 would have
significant consequences to its economic activities and to its other tax
planning methods for a project. To be thorough, Proposals 1 or 2
could be triggered by either the ownership of the foreign subsidiary,
ownership of the copyright at any time before principal photography,
or ownership as defined under one of the existing tax standards.
The procedures of Proposals 1 or 2 wherein the gross amounts of
MPIs received are added to the amount of tax owed or disallowing
tax credits the taxpayer otherwise would receive would both be very
effective in reaching the goal of a dollar-for-dollar reduction of
positive carrots these taxpayers are receiving. Arguably, focusing on
the tax paid via the domestic tax return and not the gross receipts of
the taxpayer (i.e., adding the foreign MPI amounts to tax owed by the
taxpayer and not to its revenue received) may result in more tax paid
by the taxpayer when choosing to accept the foreign MPIs than if they
didn't choose to accept them. This would be more than a dollar-for-
dollar reduction, because of the costs involved in obtaining the foreign
MPIs. However, from an effectiveness and administrative perspective
it is necessary to focus on the tax owed, especially because the taxpayer
has the choice to accept the foreign MPIs or not accept them, with the
260. For example, ownership principles in determining the taxpayer eligible to claim
depreciation or capitalization of costs under I.R.C. § 167 (2013).
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overall costs associated with accepting them simply to be factored with
the attendant benefits from accepting them.
A further issue with the ownership tests could be that taxpayers
subject to the new tax laws would move their corporate headquarters,
their intellectual property ownership and/or project development
outside the United States. However, it is unlikely that the primary
taxpayers currently utilizing foreign MPIs-such as Disney, Fox, and
other studios-will move their headquarters out of the United States
based on the ability to receive foreign MPIs. These MNCs rely on the
United States for vital government resources26 1 which would be less
262 asavailable if they were no longer U.S.-based organizations. It is also
unlikely that these MNCs would move development of the projects
outside the United States since the resources they use to develop
these projects such as the human resources consisting of executives,
writers, actors, and other personnel are located within the United
States. Because the time frame of the development process is less
defined than principal photography or the editing of a film or
television project, it would be more difficult for these taxpayers to
move the required human resources outside the United States for
indefinite periods of time required to develop each film or television
project. It is possible that these taxpayers could move their
intellectual property (the ownership of the film and television
projects), outside the United States which is currently a primary tax
avoidance move utilized by non-entertainment MNCs. 263 A provision
261. See supra Part VI.C.2.(b).
262. See PHINEAS BAXANDALL & ABIGAIL CAPLOVITz FIELD, UNITED STATES
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, WHO'S AFRAID OF INVERSION? CONGRESS CAN
CLAMP DOWN ON OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS 3 (2013) states:
[C]hanging the designated location of the corporate headquarters is
rarely a practical way to go about it. In the last decade Congress has
erected several protections that made it very difficult for companies to
portray themselves to the IRS as a foreign company while simultaneously
maintaining the same level of activity within the United States. Congress
has created new laws, and new rules issued by the Treasury on June 7,
2012, raise the bar prohibitively high for most companies.
263. Offshore Profiting Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code-Part 1 (Microsoft and
Hewlett-Packard), Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Comm. of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76071/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76071.pdf.
Senator Carl Levin explains:
The first step in shifting profits offshore takes place when a U.S.
company games the transfer pricing process to sell or license valuable
assets that it developed in the United States to its subsidiary in a low-tax
2014]
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in the revised law stating that ownership of the copyright at any time
before principal photography could be a provision which would
counteract the transfer of the project outside the United States after it
is developed within the country.
An issue with Proposal 2 might arise if the taxpayer does not have
any other tax credits to be disallowed on its U.S tax return. In this
case, the loss of tax credits could be carried forward, but this method
is less effective because the U.S. taxpayer could carefully plan not to
receive U.S. tax credits indefinitely, thereby circumventing the dollar-
for-dollar reduction. In practical terms, this issue may be less of an
issue regarding the recipients of foreign MPIs because it is estimated
that corporations in the motion picture, broadcasting and
telecommunications industries claimed more than $204 million in
general business tax credits in 2008.26
Proposal 2 also suffers from a disconnect between the foreign MPIs
received and the disallowance of tax credits unrelated to the production of
the project. The tax credits that are available to the taxpayer in calculating
its U.S. tax owed have been drafted to reflect certain tax policy goals
which would be frustrated by their disallowance based on unrelated
activities. However, the alternative minimum tax is an example of tax
code sections that effectively disallow otherwise allowable tax deductions
and credits for reasons unrelated to the tax policy goals that underlie such
deductions and credits.265
2. Proposals 3, 4, and 5
Proposals 3, 4, and 5 are tax amendments that are already
recommended by scholars, tax experts, bipartisan commissions,
members of the U.S. Senate and Congress, and the Obama
Administration.2 6 All are intended to reform the current
international tax laws.267 Applying them to runaway production, and
jurisdiction for a price that is lower than fair market.... These
transactions transfer valuable intellectual property to wholly owned
subsidiaries. Multinational companies and the legions of economists and
tax lawyers advising them take full advantage of this situation to set an
artificially low sale price to minimize the U.S. parent company's taxable
income.
Id.
264. TAX POLICY CTR. TAx FACTS, CORPORATE, TAX CREDITS BY INDUSTRY (2008),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=358&Topic2id=70.
265. I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (2013).
266. See supra note 5.
267. Id.
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more narrowly to the amounts of foreign MPIs accepted by taxpayers
who are engaged in foreign film and television production, would be
their application to a relatively small segment of U.S. international
economic activity. As such, the tax policy concerns that are involved
when contemplating the application of these tax reforms to all U.S.
citizens and their international economic activity are less complicated.
Ending deferral and disallowing deductions and foreign tax
credits with respect to any project that receives any foreign MPI
would be effective because it would increase the cost associated with
accepting foreign MPIs. Taxes that would otherwise be deferred or
not otherwise owed would be required to be paid immediately.
However, all of these proposals affect the taxation of activity that
occurs outside the United States, and they therefore remain subject to
the numerous tax avoidance opportunities that currently exist in U.S.
tax laws. As such, the extent to which these proposals will eventually
become a tangible cost for the taxpayers that continue to accept
foreign MPIs is unclear, rendering their effectiveness less predictable.
In addition, there are potential tax treaty concerns with these
amendments. Proposal 5 has an additional obstacle in that the United
States has entered over sixty-five income tax treaties, the terms of
which generally require the United States to eliminate double
taxation, which it currently does by offering FTCs.26 Therefore, the
disallowance of FICs with respect to runaway production may violate
the U. S. treaty duties to eliminate double taxation even though it is
clear that the United States has the right to enact legislation
subsequent and contrary to the original treaty.269
Proposals 3, 4, and 5 are open to potential criticism by virtue of
their potential negative effect on the competitiveness of the
companies attempting to do business in foreign countries. This is
contrasted with the potential positive effect of increasing the United
268. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 5, at 4-5; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, PUBLICATION 901, U.S. TAX TREATIES 58-59 (2013).
269. Morse, supra note 157, at 565. Discussing a corporate transition tax's interaction
with U.S. tax treaties:
A U.S. tax treaty partner could [be expected to] object to a corporate
offshore profits transition tax if it reduced the tax revenue of the treaty
partner. The incursion of a transition tax into the pre-enactment
jurisdiction of a U.S. treaty partner would not necessarily present a
technical problem under U.S. law. The "last in time" rule provides that a
later-enacted statute trumps a U.S. tax treaty.
Id.
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States' ability to compete for capital investments by retaining the
production that would otherwise runaway. Many of the positive
carrots that are provided by the U.S. government (deferral,
mismatching of foreign and domestic income and expenses, and
FTCs) are provided to enable U.S. companies to compete with
foreign businesses. 270 The concern is based on the fact that foreign
companies pay lower federal taxes thereby lowering the competitors'
cost of capital and increasing their competitive advantage. The
positive carrots provided to U.S. businesses through the U.S. tax laws
are designed to lower the U.S. companies' marginal tax rates, thereby
lowering the U.S. business' cost of capital and enabling U.S.
businesses to compete. However, Proposals 3, 4, and 5 would only be
triggered if the U.S. taxpayer accepts tax incentives beyond the
amount presently provided by U.S. tax laws. Put another way, if they
do not accept those tax incentives, then the positive carrots presently
available to these taxpayers remain fully intact, thus continuing to
fulfill the policy goals of lowering the cost of capital and enabling
them to compete in the worldwide market. The evidence of the
worldwide dominance of the U.S.-based MNCs that engage in film
and television production is well documented.2 1' The withdrawal of
positive carrots provided to these taxpayers from foreign MPIs will
result in less subsidization to these taxpayers, but it is not likely to
make it impossible for them to continue to dominate the world
market of film and television. However, it is an issue that would need
to be monitored after the enactment of the tax law proposals.
3. Issues Applicable to Proposals 1 Through 5
The implementation of Proposals 1 through 5 will affect the
decision process of taxpayers that are presently moving capital and
operations abroad as to whether or not to accept foreign MPIs. If the
270. Engel, supra note 160, at 1540; Peroni, Fleming, Jr. & Shay, Curtailing Deferral,
supra note 5, at 536-39.
271. EDWARD HERRMANN AND ROBERT MCCHESNEY, GLOBAL MEDIA: THE NEW
MISSIONARIES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998); MOTION PICTURE ASS'N OF AM., THE
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY TO
THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Resources/92be6469-ld3c-
4955-b572-1d3f40f80787.pdf ("Industry registered a positive balance of trade in nearly
every country in the world with $14.3 billion in exports worldwide in 2011, up 5% from
2010."); Joseph Devlin, Note, Canada and International Trade in Culture: Beyond National
Interests, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 177 (2004) ("Foreign products in Canada account
for 45% of book sales, 81% of English language magazines on newsstands, 85% of film
distribution revenue, and 94 to 97% of theater screen time. This market dominance by the
United States troubles Canadians. . . .").
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proposals achieve their intended effect of decreasing the number of
projects and the aggregate amount of money spent in the countries
currently offering these incentives, it is reasonable to conclude that
the countries affected by these decreases will not welcome the
changes. It is possible that these countries will claim that these
changes are violations of international trade laws. However, the
analysis of such claims is beyond the scope of this article. Even if
these countries concede that the United States has the right to
provide or withdraw positive carrots such as those provided in the
proposals, these countries may still seek to counter these tax law
revisions by applying similar withdrawals of subsidization to other
industries which would result in a net loss to the United States in
terms of economic utility and/or U.S. tax revenue. Ascertaining the
net overall economic revenue and/or U.S. tax revenue, if any, lost
from the proposals and any reactions from countries to their
implementation would not be a simple task, and in any case, is also
beyond the scope of this article.
Included in the implementation of the proposals would be a
recommendation to eliminate the current positive carrots within
I.R.C. sections 181 and 199. I.R.C. section 181 ended as of December
31, 2013, and as of the time this article was written, it is not known if it
will be extended, although I.R.C. section 199 is scheduled to continue.
As stated in Part III.B., a positive carrot should be reevaluated after
it has been in place for a reasonable time. These tax provisions have
been in place since 2004, which is a reasonable amount of time to
evaluate their effect on runaway production. They have clearly not
eliminated this public policy problem.272 Since runaway production
has persisted since the enactment of these tax provisions and these
laws have had a cost in the loss of U.S. tax revenue, they should be
ended when the proposals provided in this article are implemented.
It also has been suggested that the federal government should utilize
the Commerce Clause to issue a moratorium on motion picture and
television tax incentives provided by U.S. states.273 It is an interesting
proposal but is beyond the scope of this article.
272. See supra Part IV.
273. Luther, supra note 10, at 16, 45 (citing Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick,
Congress Should End the Economic War Among the States, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS ANNUAL REPORTS (1994)); see also McDonald, Down the Rabbit Hole,
supra note 10, at 160 (citing Schuyler M. Moore, Commentary Could a Single Federal Tax
Credit End the Economic War Among the States?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, May 29,
2009, at 9); see generally Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of Corporate Seduction: Tax




Runaway film and television production is a public policy
problem that continues to drain economic activity, jobs and tax
revenue from the United States. In recognition of this issue, U.S.
international tax laws have been targeted for reform because they
encourage and enable taxpayers to invest funds and move production
overseas, which lead to the adverse results noted above. This article
proposed a different assessment of the runaway film and television
production problem by framing the issue within the current reform of
U.S. international tax laws rather than within international trade and
labor law. From this perspective, this article explained how the
taxpayers involved in runaway production, namely, MNCs, are
essentially subsidized twice when moving operations and production
offshore. First, MNCs are subsidized by the U.S. government through
U.S. tax laws that allow MNCs to engage in tax avoidance through
such techniques as deferral, crossing foreign tax credits, mismatching
of foreign expenses with U.S. income, and other available methods.
Second, these taxpayers also receive additional money from foreign
governments when they accept motion picture incentives from foreign
governments when engaging in production in such foreign countries-
double dipping, so to speak.
The factors that influence a decision to runaway when producing
a film or television production have been identified and reviewed so
as to better understand the nature of the issue. Although there are
numerous factors that influence the decision to runaway, including
creative factors, it is clear that foreign MPIs are a significant factor in
deciding where to locate production. It is also clear that the runaway
film and television problem is a tax issue based on foreign
governments' utilization of their tax laws and tax enforcement
agencies to attract capital, investments and operations to their
countries. As such, the use by foreign governments of their tax laws
to alter the behavior of taxpayers not based in their country (in this
case, to attract capital, investments and operations to their countries,
i.e., runaway production) affects the U.S. tax code (specifically, the
U.S. international tax laws), and therefore indicates the need for an
active response by the U.S. government
However, before proposing tax law amendments to address the
problem, the remedies proposed and implemented by the U.S. federal
(providing a general overview of the Commerce Clause and state tax subsidies "that
encourage investment within the state")).
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and state governments have been reviewed. This analysis clearly
reveals that none of the implemented remedies have solved the
problem of runaway production, but they have further reduced the
tax revenue of the federal and state governments in a time of U.S.
economic and fiscal crisis. This article reviewed the public policy
tools of "carrots, sticks and sermons" in order to assist in the
understanding of the remedies proposed to solve the runaway
problem, and to clarify what is a proper analysis of a government's
decision to discontinue a positive carrot. Eliminating a positive carrot
provision in the law is not properly characterized as a negative carrot
or a stick, but simply the withdrawal of government subsidization, i.e.,
the positive carrot.
A review of U.S. international tax policy shows that reforming U.S.
tax laws to account for foreign MPIs will make U.S. tax laws more
efficient and more equitable, while providing a broader U.S. tax base.
Five possible reforms have been identified to achieve a dollar-for-dollar
elimination of the MPIs to essentially withdraw an amount of positive
carrots that the U.S. government currently provides through the U.S. tax
code equal to the amount received through a foreign MPI. The most
effective and efficient reforms focus on the U.S. tax return of the
taxpayer that accepts foreign MPIs because many opportunities still
remain in the U.S. international tax laws for taxpayers to skillfully avoid
paying taxes to the U.S., which would circumvent the goals identified in
this article. Although it has become clear that the interaction between
the receipt of foreign MPIs and U.S. international tax laws require
amendments to U.S. tax laws, the remedies proposed in this article are
provided as a starting point, and further research is required to better
understand the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal.
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